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The Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) program represents a 
revolutionary paradigm shift in the evolution of command and control systems. As an 
umbrella program encompassing various command, control, communications, computers, 
and intelligence (C41) systems, JMCIS provides a central pool of operations and planning 
information to the battlespace commander. The key to the JMCIS concept is migration of 
legacy "stove-pipe" command and control systems to an open architecture environment 
based on a common "core" set of svftware called the Unified Build. This common "core" 
software enables basic functions to be utilized by all applicable software segments and 
ensures consistency of processes throughout the system. 
The JMCIS concept brings significant advantages to the command and control 
environment including interoperability among Joint organizations and the DoD, financial 
savings through the development and use of comml'ln software, decreased life-cycle 
management costs through maintenance of a single system, and implementation of 
common standards. 
B. SCOPE 
The objective of this thesis is to provide a detailed examination of the JMCIS 
conr.ept and the role of the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) local area 
network. Following the background information on JMCIS and the SCI local area 
network, an interpretive analysis is presented for each of the specific security 
requirements developed for the SCI local area network. While there are various areas of 
security with established requirements, the author specifically analyzes the security 
requirements under the broad category of Technical (Computer) Security. This thesis will 
not address issues related to Communications Security (COMSEC). 
C. OVERVIEW OF CHAPTERS 
1. Introduction 
Chapter 1 discusses the purpose and scope of the thesis. 
2. Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) 
Chapter II provides a chronological history of DoD policies, various command 
and control systems, and the progression to the current open architecture environment of 
JMCIS. Following the history ofJMCJS is a general outline of the components of the 
architecture and justifications, from an operational and financial perspective, of the need to 
move towards a JMCIS concept. Finally, the philosophy and objectives of JMCIS are 
presented to validate the need for a design to change the current method of developing 
command and control systems. 
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3. The Sensitive Compartment Information (SCI) Local Area 
Network (LAN) 
Chapter III presents a general discussion of the differences in GENSER and 
SCI information and the necessity for separate, more restrictive access and storage 
requirements for SCI data. The demand for an SCI local area network, distinct and 
isolated from the JMCIS GENSER local area network, is justified by the need to add 
value to the commander's overall tactical picture without disclosing sources of this 
potentially more sensitive information. Finally, the SCI local area network architecture 
and the system-high mode of operation are discussed to observe the different operating 
concepts and procedures as opposed to normal GENSER operations. 
4. Computer Security 
Chapter IV introduces the concept of computer security and why the increasing 
use of computers throughout DoD has heightened the need for measures to combat 
security related problems. Simple access to computer networks is becoming 
commonplace and the threat of malicious software code introduction into a computer 
system is growing. As a result, the DoD has developed the Trusted Computer System 
Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) as a means to quantify or measure the trust placed in 
computer systems. The levels of the TCSEC are explained and the increasing assurance 
associated with each division and class is presented. Finally, a hypothetical scenario is 
given to illustrate the consequences of enemy exploitation of a command and control 
system. 
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5. Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) Local Area 
Network Security Requirements 
Chapter V presents the background information necessary to understand the 
standards used to develop the security requirements for the SCI local area network. The 
individual requirements established for Technical (Computer) Security are provided, 
followed by detailed analysis of the requirements. For the individual analysis, multiple 
sources are used to validate requirements but the primary source is the Trusted Computer 
System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC). The TCSEC is the accepted industry standard for 
trusted systems and its technical evaluation methodologies are well established. 
6. Conclusions 
Chapter VI provides a conclusion and recommendations to the thesis. 
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II. JOINT MARITIME COMMAND INFORMATION 
SYSTEM (JMCIS) 
To understand the concept and the philosophy of JMCIS, the external evolutionary 
and developmental factors must first be examined. Changes in government and 
Department ofDefense (DoD) information management policy and the complexion of the 
command and control systems absorbed under the JMCIS umbrella are the two defining 
elements in the evolution of JMCIS. 
A. POLICY 
The policies that have had the most significant impact in shaping the evolution of 
JMCIS are DoD's Corporate Information Management (CIM), The Joint Staff's "C4I for 
the Warrior", and the Navy's Copernicus architecture programs. These policies have 
contributed to the development of JMCIS by directing the progress of the command and 
control environment from which it evolved. 
1. DoD's Corporate Information Management (CIM) 
Defense Management Review Decision (DMRD) 918 provided the initial 
direction of the Corporate Information Management (CIM) initiative administered by the 
Chapter II is the product of a collaborative effort between researchers engaged 
in related JMCIS theses. Contributors include LT Bruce F. Loveless, USN, 
Capt. Todd F. Sweeney, USMC, and the author. 
5 
Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA). CIM is a strategic management initiative 
intended to guide the evolution of the DoD enterprise by capturing the benefits of the 
information revolution. It emphasizes both a funrtional and technical management focus 
to achieve a combination of improved business processes and effective application of 
information technology across the functional areas of DoD. It is embodied in policies and 
programs, implementation guidance, and supporting resources, to help functional 
managers guide and implement changes to processes, data, and systems across the DoD. 
[Ref. l:p. l] 
The management structure ofCIM has four "pillars" that support improved 
Defense capabilities: common information systems~ shared, standard data~ re-engineered 
processes; and a computer and communications infrastructure. The overarching goal of 
CIM is to enable commanders of military forces and managers of support activities to 
achieve the highest degree of capability in their operations through the effective use of 
information applied in improved functional processes. The vision of this initiative provides 
for global end-to-end information connectivity among US and allied forces. In this 
context, information is considered a critical mission capability and force multiplier for 
worldwide readiness, mobility, responsiveness, and operations. Joint interoperability and 
information integration on the battlefield is emphasized to result in significantly improved 
joint service and multinational operations. [Ref I :p. 3] 
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2. The Joint Stafrs "C41 for the Warrior" 
C41 for the Warrior is a concept for DoD information management first 
published by The Joint Staff in 1992. It is clearly targeted at solving the C41 
interoperability issues among the services. The intent is to provide an unifying C41 
concept that will support the requirements of the joint force Warrior at the battlefield 
level, while remaining consistent with DoD policy and national security objectives. This 
focus is expressed by former Chairman, General Colin L. Powell, in the following 
statement: 
The C41 for the Warrior concept will give the battlefield commander access to all 
information needed to win in war and will provide the information when, where, and 
how the commander wants it. The C41 for the Warrior concept starts with the 
Warrior's requirements and provides a roadmap to reach the objective of a seamless, 
secure, interoperable global C41 network for the Warrior. [Ref 2:p. 13] 
C41 for the Warrior is considered a seminal doctrine that is intended to guide 
the evolution of individual service C41 architectures into a broad Global Command and 
Control System (GCCS). [Ref 3 :p. 49) The concept principles have been incorporated in 
the Joint Staff's GCCS program. 
At the center of the C41 for the Warrior concept is the establishment of a global 
C4I capability that allows the Warrior to define the battlespace and to "plug in" and "pull" 
timely, relevant information anytime, anyplace in the performance of any mission. The 
Warrior, by defining the battlespace, determines the information to "pull" rather than have 
information "pushed" from various sources. The Warriors neither want nor need the 
cumulative knowledge of multiple sources dumped into their battlespace information 
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systems. They want only the specific infonnation they need to win the fight~ and they 
want it when they need it, where they need it, and in the fonn in which it will do them the 
most good. This demand pull concept provides the capability for the Warrior to poll the 
global C41 network for any desired infonnation from any location. at any point in time. 
This is a key principle of the C41 for the Warrior concept and a guiding concept for future 
DoD and Navy C41 architecture development. 
3. The Navy's Copernicus Architecture 
The Copernicus Architecture is the current architectural guidance designed to 
restructure all Navy C41 systems. The Copernicus Architecture, Phase l: Requirements 
Definition, published in 1991, provides both a new C41 architecture to replace the current 
Navy system and a programmatic investment strategy to construct it over the next decade. 
[Ref. 4:p. 3-2] It is intended to establish a vision of an overall C41 architecture for the 
Navy. 
The Copernicus Architecture is primarily a telecommunications system designed 
around a series of global infonnation exchange systems ashore and tactical infonnation 
exchange systems afloat. The architecture concept is based on four pillars: first, virtual 
global networks called Global Infonnation Exchange Systems (GLOBIXS)~ second, 
metropolitan area networks called CINC Command Centers (CCC)~ third, tactical virtual 
nets called Tactical Data lnfonnation Exchange Systems (T ADIXS); and fourth, 
interconnecting the previous systems to support the Tactical Command Center (TCC) 
afloat. In this concept, data can be forwarded from the shored based sensor-to-sensor 
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infrastructure to the tactical commander's C2 infrastructure afloat. Just as Copernicus 
brought about a revolutionary paradigm shift in astronomy, the Copernicus Architecture 
was so named because it represents a revolutionary paradigm shift in command and 
control systems by being centered on the tactical needs of the operator aflo~t. 
[Ref 5:p. 10-12] 
A key operational concept of the Copernicus Architecture is the recognition of 
the Space and Electronic Warfare Commander (SEWC) as part of the Composite Warfare 
Commander (CWC) doctrine afloat. This action follows the establishment of SEW as a 
designated warfare area within the Navy by the CNO in 1989, which doctrinally assigned 
command and control (C2) functions to the SEW mission. In many ways, this early 
recognition of the importance of information management for the operational commander 
served as a building block for further DoD architecture development. The Copernicus 
goal of establishing a "common operating environment" now is considered part of the 
Defense Department's "C41 for the Warrior" initiative, which requires the Army, Navy, 
and Air Force to develop, through a phased process, approaches to making their C41 
data-transfer systems fully compatible for joint operations. [Ref 3 :p. 52] 
B. SYSTEMS 
JMCIS is an umbrella system that has incorporated various functionalities and 
attributes of previous command and control systems. The philosophy of incorporating 
other systems capabilities and functionality is not unique to JMCIS, rather it is a trait 
inherited from previous systems. The Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS}, Navy 
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Tactical Command System- Afloat (NTCS-A), and Operations Support System (OSS) are 
examples of systems that applied this same evolutionary methodology and directly 
influenced the development of JMCIS. 
1. Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS) 
JOTS began as a prototyping effort that was first deployed aboard ship in the 
early 1980s. This system provided the operational commander with the first integrated 
display of data for decision support purposes. System functionality eventually included 
track management, track analysis, environment prediction, and a variety of tactical 
overlays and Tactical Decision Aids (TDAs). JOTS was capable of receiving various data 
and message input such as Link II, Link 14, Tactical Data Information Exchange 
System-A (T ADIXS A), Officer in Tactical Command Information Exchange System 
(OTCIXS), High Interest Track (IDT) Broadcasts, and U.S. Message Text Format 
(USMTF) messages. JOTS allowed the Fleet Command Centers to interface with 
command ships and other shore installations. Through the use of a tactical data base 
manager (TDBM), JOTS provided a consistent tactical battlespace picture for all 
supporting warfare commanders afloat and ashore. [Ref. S:p. 60] 
The original prototyping effort of JOTS lead to the development of the JOTS 
Command and Control System by the late 1980s. The primary goal ofthe JOTS was to 
integrate information systems onto common hardware and software platforms to provide 
for the sharing of data bases as well as maximize limited shipboard area. JOTS-derived 
systems have since been installed onboard over 200 Navy ships, at several US Navy shore 
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intelligence centers, onboard US Coast Guard vessels, onboard allied ships, and a various 
allied sites. [Ref 6:p. 1-1] As JOTS matured further and as other C31 systems were 
developed and deployed, it became apparent that there was much duplication of software 
and functionality across systems. This duplication led to increased development, 
maintenance, and training costs and the stated goal of interoperability across systems was 
virtually non-existent. This led to low interoperability and most importantly, led to 
conflicting information from multiple sources being provide to the operators. 
[Ref 6:p. 1-1] 
2. Navy Tactical Command System - Afloat (NTCS-A) 
NTCS-A evolved from JOTS in the early 1990s, from the consolidation of a 
number of prototypes of individual "stovepipe" shipboard command and control software 
programs, including the Flag Data Display System (FDDS), the Joint Operations Tactical 
System (JOTS), the electronic Warfare Coordination Module (EWCM), and the Afloat 
Correlation System (ACS). [Ref J:p. 52] Additional NTCS-A functionality was 
incorporated from other stand-alone or prototype C41 systems such as the Prototype 
Ocean Surveillance Terminal (POST) and the Naval Intelligence Processing System 
(NIPS). Central to this consolidation effort was the abstraction of the afloat software into 
a common "core" set of software that could be used throughout the afloat community as 
the basis for their systems. This led to a set of common software originally called 
Government OffThe Shelf(GOTS) version 1.1. 
The common core software concept was extended to the shore community to 
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reduce development costs and ensure interoperability. This effort resulted in a collection 
of software commonly referred to as the Unified Build (UB) version 2.0 or GOTS 2.0. 
This software is now deployed both afloat, in NTCS-A, and ashore, in Operations Support 
System (OSS). The strength ofthese two systems is that they are built on top of a 
common set of functions so that advancements and improvements in one area are 
immediately translatable to advancements in the other area. [Ref. 6: p. 1-l] 
3. Operations Support System (OSS) 
OSS is a system that evolved from the functionalities of the Navy World-Wide 
Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) Standard Software, Operations 
Support Group Prototype, Fleet Command Center Battle Management Program, and 
JOTS. This system is considered the shore installation variant ofNTCS-A and is often 
referred to as Navy Command and Control System-Ashore (NCCS-A). By migrating the 
OSS into the JMCIS architecture, the Navy is seeking management economies of scale 
and performance enhancements in OSS. 
C. JMCIS 
JMCIS represents the next logical step in the evolution of Navy C4I systems. The 
addition of functions to NTCS-A has led to the creation of a new version of that system, 
which has been designated the Joint Maritime Command Information System. 
[Ref. 3:p. 56] JMCIS is described as a "overarching architecture" that is still evolving as 
fleet operators refine C41 requirements and the functionality of other systems is migrated 
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to the JMCIS architecture. The JMCIS approach to adding new functionality instead of 
building new systems allows the Navy to benefit from a single-configuration management 
approach. The system software provides the basic function, such as display control, 
message traffic control, and specific applications for various classes of equipped ships. 
[Ref 3 :p. 52] 
Programmatically, JMCIS has consolidated the functions ofNTCS-A and its 
complimentary ashore program, the OSS. The two systems are expected to form a 
significant core of the ongoing development of DoD-wide C41 architectures, referred to as 
Global Command and Control System (GCCS), that will continue to consolidate the C41 
initiatives of the individual services. [Ref 3:p. 52] 
I. Genesis and History 
JMCIS is the current state of C41 technology initially envisioned in 1981 by 
Vice Admiral (Ret.) Jerry 0. Tuttle as the future of command and control. The JMCIS 
idea was cultivated from efforts to evolve interoperable C3 I systems that began in the mid 
1980's with the development of the Joint Operational Tactical System (JOTS) Command 
and Control System. The system was also designed to operate on the Tactical Advanced 
Computing (T AC) family of computers, as non-proprietary, open architecture that could 
be easily transported to subsequent improved versions of the TAC. [Ref 6:p. 1-3] 
Under the direction of SPA WAR (PD-60), the core software GOTS 1.1 was 
compiled for use throughout the afloat community as the basis for all C31 systems. GOTS 
2.0 was called the Unified Build (UB) 2.0 and was developed to include the ashore 
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community to further increase C31 system interoperability. The Unified Build is 
confirmation of Vice Admiral (Ret.) Tuttle's statement • 
The future ofC41 ... will be built on a foundation ofinteroperability, open systems, 
and a common operating environment. 'Standardization' will be our battle cry. [Ref 7] 
2. System Migration 
In November 1993, Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) for C41, Mr. Emmett 
Paige, issued a memorandum requiring all DoD services to develop a Jetailed plan for 
migration of individual systems into a common C41 framework. All systems nominated 
for migration to a common framework were to be completed within three years. Those 
systems not designated by the respective service as a candidate for migration were to 
either cease to exist or apply for exception status. [Ref 8) Rear Admiral John Gauss of 
SPA WAR PD-60 stated that obsolete systems must be retired as soon as possible even if 
some functions have not been replaced due to the significant decreases in DoD funding. 
[Ref 9) The ASD memorandum brought the issue of a common C41 framework espoused 
in the C41 For the Warrior plan to the front. A form ofthis common C41 framew01k was 
in existence prior to the issuance of the memorandum and JMCIS is that architecture 
selected for the U.S Navy and Marine Corps. Secretary Paige's memorandum accelerated 
existing Navy and Marine Corps migration planning and established JMCIS as a practical 
alternative for the other services. The legacy systems that were migrated into JOTS and 
eventually into JMCIS are depicted in Figure 3-1 [Ref 1 0). The systems that were 
initially migrated into JMCIS were operationally oriented ?.nd eventually this migration 
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philosophy was extended to logistical and intelligence related systems. Table 3-1 provides 
a listing of the full names for •.. j migrated systems. 
JMCIS Architectural Evolution 
PRE 1993 1993 
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CID/CIU 






Figure 3-1 Migration of Legacy Systems [Ref. I 0] 
3. What is JMCIS? 
1996 1997 
JMCIS is a system built as an architectural framework to meet specific Navy 
and DoD command and control capabilities. Just like Microsoft WindowsTM, JMCIS 
provides an environment for applications that consolidates common functions. In 
Windows ™, multiple applications can share common utilities such as printing and file 
IS 
TABLE 3-1 MIGRATION SYSTEMS 
Abbreviation Full System Name 
NIPS NTCS-A Intelligence Processing Services 
JOTS Joint OpcrationaJ TacticaJ System 
TFCC TacticaJ Flag Command Center 
ACS Afloat Correlation System 
EWCM Electronic Warfare Coordination Module 
POST Prototype Ocean Surveillance TerminaJ 
ATP Advanced Tracking Prototype 
NWESS Navy WMCCS Software Standardization 
FHLT Force High Level System 
oss Operations Support System 
TSC Tactical Support Center 
STT Shore Targeting System 
ccsc Cryptologic Combat Support Console 
cess Cryptologic Combat Support System 
·-
CIDICIU Cryptologic Interface Dc:vice/Unit 
NTCS-A Navy TacticaJ Command System - Afloat 
NAVSSI Navigation Sensor System Interface 
NITES NTCS-A Integrated Tactical Environmental Subsystem 
SSEE Ships SignaJ Exploitation Equipment 
SNAP Shipboard Non-tacticaJ ADP Program 
MRMS Maintenance Resource Management System 
NALCOMIS Navy Aviation Logistics Command Management 
Information System 
NTCSS Navy Tactical Command Support System 
BGPHES Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System 
OBUIOED Ocean Surveillance Information System (OSIS) 
Baseline Upgrade 
management, rather than duplicating those functions for each application. For command 
and control systems, JMCIS provides various common utilities including mapping, tactical 
database display, and cartographic functions among others. This collection of utilities 
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comprises the JMCIS core and is graphically depicted as a part of the COE in Figure 3-2. 
[Ref. 6:p. 2-2] The core is maintained and expanded based upon the migration oflegacy 
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Figure 3-2 JMCIS COE [Ref. 6:p. 2-2] 
The consolidation of common functions allows all applications to access the most efficient 
utility and provides the opportunity to easily update the core utilities with improved 
versions. In conventional client/server style, JMCIS servers provide core services to the 
rest of the LAN and each workstation may have both the same or different application 
software running. 
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a. Components of JMCIS 
( 1) Applications 
Depicted vertically in Figure 3-2, applications access the JMCIS core 
services via Application Program Interfaces (APis). In Figure 3-2 the applications 
annotated as 'Account Groups' are the standard applications that come as a part of JMCIS. 
These house-keeping applications are custom environments for the common activities of 
System Administration, Security Administration, Database Administration and the 
standard JMCIS operator environment. The applications annotated as 'Segments' are a 
sample of some of the unique applications that have been developed or migrated into the 
JMCIS environment. The specific Segments listed represent: 
• SEWC - Space and Electronic Warfare Commander 
• STRIKE - Strike Plot 
• JOTS TDAS - Joint Operational Tactical System Tactical Decision Aids 
(2) Common Operating Environment (COE) 
The COE consists of the UNIX Operating System (OS), X Window 
graphical windowing system, and Motif standard styles, as well as core software for 
receiving and processing messages, correlation, updating the track database, and software 
for generating cartographic displays. [Ref 6:p. 2-1] 
(3) Unified Build (liB) 
The VB is the foundation for all JMCIS software. The VB is a set of 
software components that include the Common Operating Environment (COE) and a 
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standard software base for central applications and library functions necessary for basic 
command. control, and supporting functions. 
(4) Segment 
A segment is a software application that operates in the JMCIS runtime 
environment utilizing core functionalities for common operations. Segments access the 
core functionality through a standard set of APis. The standard set of APis are managed 
by the core developers and are the access vehicle to core functionality. Unique 
fur.ctionality for individual segments is provided by the individual applications source 
executable code. 
(5) Variant 
A variant is a subset of segments, from the JMCIS Superset, installed 
for a specific mission area such as mission planning or battle group database management. 
The collection of various JMCIS segments are simply customized modules that define the 
JMCIS variant. 
(6) GENSER Local Area Network I SCI Local Area Network 
In most JMCIS applications there are two separate and distinct 
operational local area networks, referred to as JMCIS LANs. The GENSER local area 
network generates the primary tactical picture (situational display) and provides input to 
both the supported commander and also to the SCI local area network. The SCI local 
area network receives the GENSER information and applies SCI information, enhancing 
the GENSER picture. Downgraded or sanitized SCI information can also be provided 
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directly, via sanitization (Esprit/Radiant Mercury) to GENSER systems. [Ref II :p. 2] 
SCI and GENSER will be explained in more detail in Chapter Ill 
b. The Three Perspectives of JMCIS 
(1) Sailor.· Soldier Perspective 
To the end user, JMCIS represents a Command Information System 
which is distributed :tcross a Local Area Network (LAN) of workstations. Operators are 
able to access all required functionality from any workstation regardless of physical 
location or the actual location where the processing is taking place. The user is presented 
with only the functionality needed to meet their mission and other unneeded functionality 
is hidden to prevent overwhelming the user. An operator with a different set of tasks is 
presented with a different set of functionality but both operators perceive that the system 
looks and operates in the same way. JMCIS will appear to the operators as the identical 
Command Information System in use by military personnel in sister services with 
completely different mission objectives. This joint commonality is of increasing 
importance as a result of the expanded role the services are performing in the joint arena. 
[Ref. 6:p. 1-7] 
(2) Program Manager Perspective 
From the perspective of a military program manager, JMCIS presents 
the opportunity for an umbrella program which can encompass several programs. Faced 
with decreased funding, program managers can maintain program viability and achieve 
considerable savings by constructing their system from the JMCIS building blocks. In 
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these times of budget austerity, this potential savings is sometimes the only feasible option 
for the programs. [Ref 6:p. 1-7] 
(3) System Developer Perspective 
From the perspective of a system developer, JMCIS is an open 
architecture and a software development environment that offers a collection of services 
and already-built modules for Command Information Systems. The JMCIS developers 
provide detailed instructions on how to make applications or systems [MCIS compliant. 
These instructions include details on standard user interface and the procedures for using 
core functionality via APis. This core functionality has been previously developed and 
tested and therefore the developer need only produce components that are unique to their 
particular application. [Ref. 6:p. 1-7] 
D. WHY JMCIS? 
The evolution to JMCIS was an operational and financial necessity in today's world 
of rapidly changing technology and decreased funding for DoD systems. JMCIS provides 
DoD with an opportunity to stay ahead of technological growth well into the next century 
by implementing open systems architectures and ensuring standardization of software and 
hardware for C4 I systems throughout the services. 
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t. Operational Justification 
a. Commtlnd, Control, Communications, Computers, and 
Intelligence (C41) 
Command, control, communications and intelligence are pivotal to the 
success of any military mission. The addition of computers to the equation increases the 
fusion capabilities. The concept of computers being a force multiplier is espoused in the 
1993 C41 For The Warrior document. 
Fused information is more valuable to the Warrior than information received 
directly from separate, multiple sources to the degree that it provides the warrior with 
'real truth.' [Ref 2:p. 13) 
More importantly, the ability to pull on demand, information from any location at any 
moment, gives the Warrior both more flexibility and the skill to tailor decisions to his 
specific needs. [Ref 2:p. 13) 
b. Technology Explosion 
Technological leaps are being experienced on an almost exponential scale. 
Rear Admiral Walter Davis, Head of the Warfare Architecture and Systems Engineering 
Directorate at the Space and Naval Warfare Systems Command (SPA WAR) summed up 
the speed of the development of technology by saying that 11 ... the commercial computer 
industry is introducing new systems and new capabilities approximately every 18 months. 11 
[Ref 3:p. 49-56] With the average DoD major automated information system (AIS) 
acquisition taking over 24 months from requirements specification to system delivery, 
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DoD is constantly being equipped with obsolete systems. Open systems architecture is 
the solution. The crux of open systems are common development standards from which 
products can be developed using non-proprietary specifications. The advantages of using 
open systems architecture to an organization the size of DoD are profound and present the 
most efficient and practical approach to the use of hardware and software. 
One of the objectives of JMCIS is to avoid having command and control 
systems tied to a specific hardware platform or proprietary system. For this reason the 
JMCIS system is designed to operate on the family ofTAC computers. The system is 
designed to be easily transported from one version ofT AC computer to the next and be 
capable of exploiting the improved capability of the upgraded system. Rear Admiral 
Gauss stated that T AC hardware, COTS and GOTS software, and both government and 
industry standards, were to be used for all current and future JMCIS development. 
[Ref 9] With the open architecture and commercial standards used by JMCIS, advances 
in computing platforms can be easily incorporated by simply changing the host machine for 
the system. Figure 3-3 presents the dramatic increase in the number of MIPS between 
successive T AC system procurements and the T AC-4 proposed processing capability of 
the TAC-4. [Ref 7 and Ref 12] 
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Figure 3-.~ Platform Performance Improvements [Ref 7 and Ref 12] 
c. Shared Access to Common Data 
The Track Database is possibly the most important piece ofthe JMCIS 
Command Information System. This TDBM, coupled with the extensive communications 
capabilities of JMCIS, fosters greater interoperability with external sources and dattl.bases 
The TDBM provides standard procedures and formats to add, delete, modifY, and merge 
basic track data among the various workstations on the local area networks With the 
increased capabilities of the TDBM to receive multiple sources of data, fus1"n of the 
information gives the warrior more intdligent correlation [Ref 6 p 2-:2( 'l 
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Significant savings can be obtained by supporting a reduced number of lines of 
code. This reduction in lines of code is accomplished by implementing a common core of 
software and only producing the unique portions ofthe segment. Initial analysis of 
candidate command and control systems eligible for migration to JMCIS revealed 
significant reductions in post deployment software support. 
a. Configuration Management- Hardware/Software 
The financial savings of moving toward an open architecture environment 
cannot afford to be overlooked. While hardware costs have experienced a steady 
downward trend over the last several years, costs for proprietary software have 
mushroomed. The use of COTS software products combats the problem of skyrocketing 
costs by allowing the developer of a product to spread the cost of development among all 
users of the product. Achieving these economies of scale is the major cost saving 
characteristic of the JMCIS open architecture environment. Vice Admiral (Ret.) Tuttle 
noted that 11 ... the expenditures on (software) applications -- coding, debugging, and 
testing -- spiral upwards to 90% of the total computer budgets. 11 [Ref 7] 
b. Training 
In addition to the costs for hardware and software, the costs related to 
training are significant. Through the use of open architecture and standardization of 
human machine interfaces, both operator and maintenance personnel familiarization with 
one system will translate directly to other systems using T AC hardware and open 
architecture environments. The Common Operating Environment (COE) of JMCIS 
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architecture environments. The Common Operating Environment (COE) of JMCIS 
includes such standards as X Window and MOTIF style guide as well as the UNIX 
operating system. By training operators on these standard vendor products, the 
familiarization time for new personnel is limited to the minimum necessary to understand 
the new mission and results in more rapid improvement in operator performance. 
E. THE JMCIS PHILOSOPHY 
1. Don't Reinvent the Wheel 
If a component already exists. it should be utilized even if the component is not 
the optimum, best possible solution. As early as 1987 a GAO report on the issue of 
interoperability among DoD CJI systems noted that: 
Solving this problem (of interoperabi/ity) is no easy task .... It will require a great 
deal of cooperation among the services and a genuine willingness on the part of each 
service to accept interoperability even when it conflicts with some traditional service 
practices. [Ref 13:p. 18) 
Almost any module can be improved but that is rarely the issue. For example, it 
is usually possible to obtain performance improvements in drawing speeds for cartographic 
displays by customizing designs to use hardware specific features. However, this may not 
be cost effective if platform portability is a requirement, or if performance gains are 
modest relative to perceived performance. [Ref. 6:p. 1-11] In addition, bottlenecks in the 
system often can't be determined until implementation and they often show up where they 
might not normally be expected. 
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2. Existing Standards 
The commercial marketplace generally moves at a faster pace than the military 
marketplace and advancements are usually available at a faster rate. Use of commercial 
products has the advantage of lowering cost by using already built items, increases the 
probability of product enhancements because the marketplace is larger, and increases the 
probability of standardization. [Ref 6: p. 1-12] 
3. Interpretability 
Interpretation of standards are a major source of problems with interoperability. 
To combat the problem, software modules should be reused across similar applications to 
decrease the likelihood of transference between entities. This ensures that the same 
standards are applied to all users and therefore eliminates the opportunity for inaccurate or 
varying interpretations. [Ref 6:p. 1-12] 
4. Focus Attention 
Focus efforts on the development of desired but currently unavailable 
functionality instead of re-generating existing capabilities. [Ref 6:p. 1-12] 
F. THE OBJECTIVES OF JMCIS 
Given the philosophy and history of the JMCIS concept, there are a number of 
objectives which are immediately apparent. The objectives include technical 
considerations such as software reusability, enforcement of common "look and feel", and 
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standardization of interfaces. These technical objectives in tum result in the potential for 
significant cost savings and development acceleration. 
I. Commonality 
Develop a common core of software that will form the foundation for Navy and 
Joint systems. 
2. Reusability 
Develop a common core of software that is highly reusable to leverage the 
investment already made in software development. 
3. Standardization 
Reduce program development costs through objectives one and two and 
through adherence to industry standards. This includes the use of commercially available 
software components whenever possible. 
4. Engineering Base 
Through standardization and an open JMCIS architecture, establish a large base 
of trained software/systems engineers. 
5. Training 
Reduce operator training costs through enforcement of a uniform 




Solve the interoperability problem (at least partially) through common software 
and consistent system operation. 
7. Certification 
PfOvide a base of certified software so that systems performing identical 
functions will give identical answers. 
8. Testing 
Increase the amount of common, reusa1le software to reduce testing costs 
because common software can be tested and validated once and then applied to many 
programs. [Ref. 6:p. l-13] 
G. THE FUTURE 
The vision provided by strategic planning initiatives is being realized under the 
JMCIS banner. Systems continue to evolve toward the goal of an interoperable C41 
system that focuses on support to the Warrior. The National Military Strategy Document 
(NMSD) for FY 1994-1999 establishe~ C41 as the overarching C4 programming objective 
and states that : 
Consistent with the C41 for the Warrior' plan, all Service and Agency programmed 
systems must be compatible and interoperable to support joint and combined operation 
across the entire spectrum of conflict. [Ref. 14] 
GCCS is a Joint Staff sponsored program envisioned by the C41 for the Warrior 
concept and represents the next step in the evolution of command and control systems. 
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When fully implemented, GCCS will embody a network of systems providing the Warrior 
with a full complement of command and control capabilities. As part of the C41 for the 
Warrior concept, GCCS is evolving into the global, seamless "lnfosphere" capable of 
meeting the Warrior's fused information requirements. [Ref 2:p. 13] 
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III. THE SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED 
INFORMATION (SCI) LOCAL AREA NETWORK 
To understand the requirement for separate local area networks for General Service 
(GENSER) information and Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI), an appreciation 
of Sensitive Compartmented Information as a separate classification category from 
GENSER is necessary. 
A. SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) 
SCI embodies a group of security clearances and compartments which require 
separate and more restrictive access and handling procedures than required of GENSER 
information. SCI is formally defined as follows: 
Information and material that requires special controls for restricted handling 
within compartmented intelligence systems and for which compartmentation is 
established. [Ref lS:p. B-7] 
The major distinction between SCI and GENSER information is the sensitivity of 
the information source. SCI information is afforded the highest conceivable security 
safeguards because the information collected or produced by certain SCI collectors is so 
sensitive that the possibility of compromising the source could have serious consequences. 
That is, if it was discovered that information was being collected from a specific source, 
that source could be eliminated or even worse, could be used as a funnel for 
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disinformation. In an SCI environment, averting the compromise of information is of 
paramount importance. [Ref. 16:p. 15] 
Because SCI information requires separate handling and control procedures, the 
installation of equipment that processes SCI information is accomplished in separate and 
distinct spaces, both aboard ship and ashore. These special spaces, called ''restricted" 
zones, "exclusion" zones, or Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities (SCIFs) 
require that only those individuals who are appropriately cleared, and have specific 
need-to-know are given access. Further validation of the necessity for a separate local 
area network is given by: 
While the security afforded SCI data is sufficient for GENSER data, the reverse is 
not true. Thus, for example, a database in an SCI-accredited system could contain both 
GENSER and SCI information, but a GENSER database can contain only GENSER 
data. [Ref. 16:p. 8] 
B. SCI LOCAL AREA NETWORK DESCRIPTION 
1. Purpose of SCI LAN 
The JMCIS SCI local area network supports all areas of command and control 
including situation status, planning, and execution of operations. Both organic (internal) 
and non-organic (external) sources of information are processed by the JMCIS local area 
networks. Assets of the supported commander provide the organic information which 
includes operations, surveillance, and intelligence data. Non-organic information is that 
data provided to the supported commander by external assets. [Ref. 17:p.2] 
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2. System Description 
The GENSER local area network provides the primary tactical picture to the 
supported commander and also feeds the same information to the SCI local area network 
where it is fused with SCI information. This aggregate information, which provides a 
more complete overall picture can then be downgraded or sanitized and sent back to the 
GENSER local area network. The SCI local area network also provides SCI information 
directly to the supported commander as well as providing an SCI communications path for 
message release. [Ref II :p. 2] 
The SCI local area network employs the system-high mode of network security. 
System-high basically means that everyone with access to the SCI local area network hold 
the security clearance and compartmentation approvals for all information processed on 
the network but may not have the need-to-know for all the information. There are 
different variants of the SCI local area network, but the standard objective architecture 
will include several Common Cryptologic Workstations (CCWS}, Direction Finding (DF) 
Server Workstations, an Acquisition Server Workstation, and a Communications 
Workstation. Figure 3-1 illustrates the objective architecture of the SCI local area 
network and Table 3-1 defines the elements listed in the SCI LAN Objective Architecture. 
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SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED INFORMATION (SCI) LAN I 
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Figure 4-1 SCI LAN Objective Architecture [Ref 18:p. 6] 
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TABLE 3-1 
Abbreviation Full System Name 
CCWS Common Cryptologic Workstation 
CM Collection Management 
COMMS Communications 
TO Threat Detection 
n.. Threat Location 
TID &A Threat ID and Analysis 
~F Server Direction Finding Server 
~FSys Direction Finding System 
BGPHES Battle Group Passive Horizon Extension System 
ACQSys Acquisition System .. 
~ Radio Frequency Management System 
ADAS Automated Data Acquisition System 
~B DataBase 
lfADIXS Tactical Data Information Exchange System 
CHBDL Common High Bandwidth Data Link 
OPINTEL Operational Intelligence 
3. Unified Build 
The foundation for JMCIS software is the Unified Build (UB). In addition to 
the Common Operating Environment (COE), the UB is a set of software components that 
include central applications and library functions necessary for basic command, control, 
and supporting functions. Some of the system data structures and functions included in 
the central applications include: 
• System Administration 
• Message Processing System 
• File Manager 
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• CHART (maps) 
• Tactical Display Manager [Ref 17:p. 5] 
4. Segments 
As previously described, a segment is a software application that uses JMCIS 
core functionalities for common operations. Segments access the core functionality 
through a standard set of APis which are the access vehicle to core functionality. Unique 
functionality for individual segments is provided by each individual application. Specific 
segments on an SCI local area network are a function of the specific installation. That is, 
not all installations will have every segment installed since the mission and actual 
installation platform or site determine which segments are required. Current SCI local 
area network segments incude: 
• NTCS-A Intelligence Processing Services (NIPS) 
• NTCS-A Imagery Exploitation Workstation (NIEWS) 
• Strike Planning and Weapons System Support (STRIKE PLOT) 
• Special Intelligence Correlator (SIC) 
• Joint Deployable Intelligence Support System (JDISS) 
• Collection Requirements Management Application (CRMA) 
• Tactical Warning 
• Analyst Workstation (AWS) 
• Cryptologic Management [Ref 17:p. 6] 
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S. Security Functions 
In the SCI environment the Security Manager can create, maintain, and delete 
user accounts as well as set audit parameters and retrieve audit trails. Privileged role 
(Security Manager, System Administrator, and Database Manager) actions are always 
audited and the audit trail cannot be edited. Auditing cannot be disabled on the SCI local 
area network and the LAN workstations and user classifications are always the same 
(system-high mode) and cannot be changed, even by the Security Manager. User access is 
limited to the tactical display windows and they cannot access the operating system or 
gain ROOT privileges. Root access can be established for system maintenance and all 
actions are audited. [Ref17:p. 14] 
To comrol access to the SCI local area network, both Role Based Access 
Control (RBAC) and Discretionary Access Control (DAC) are employed. Discretionary 
Access Control (DAC) will be explained in detail in Chapter IV and Role Based Access 
Control is simply another dimension to DAC. In this environment, the Security Manager 
assigns roles to individuals based upon their function and access is restricted based upon 
that function. To enforce individual need-to-know, DAC can be applied which can control 
individual access by allowing or disallowing execution of menu items from the function 
menus on the tactical display. [Ref 17:p. 14] 
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IV. COMPUTER SECURITY 
The issue of computer security is presented to both illustrate the wlnerabilities and 
threats to computer systems and introduce some terminology relevant to computer 
security. The significant increase in the use of computers throughout DoD, coupled with 
the rising number of reported computer system break-ins as a result of poor management 
practices and malicious intrusions, have given new impetus to the need for combating 
security related wlnerabilities. No where is this need more recognized than in the military 
and specifically in the arena of command, control and communications (C3). 
Interoperability among diverse C3 systems is being actively promoted as both a means of 
conserving DoD's scarce financial resources and also providing the capability for various 
systems and organizational units to share infonnation. However, with this interoperability 
comes a host of security related problems. Most significantly, opportunities for malicious 
intruders to intentionally exploit weaknesses and subvert security control mechanisms are 
growing as a direct result of the interoperability brought about through the increasing use 
of open architecture environments. The Joint Maritime Command Information System 
(JMCIS), processing a wide range of classified material on the GENSER local area 
network and classified, compartmented information on the Sensitive Compartmented 
Information (SCI) local area network, is a prime target for exploitation by JjOtential 
enerrues. 
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A. WHAT IS COMPUTER SECURITY? 
There are many definitions of computer security, but in the simplest terms, computer 
security refers to the protection of computer systems and the data associated with those 
systems against any deliberate or accidental compromise or unauthorized access through 
the use of technological safeguards and managerial procedures. Commonly called 
"information security" because of the information within a computer system, computer 
security consists of three characteristics: secrecy, integrity (or accuracy), and availability 
which are depicted in Figure 4-1. [Ref 19:p. 4-6] 
1. Secrecy 
Secrecy refers to the ability of a computer system to allow only authorized 
users, by employment of a security clearance procedure, to access information within the 
system. Secrecy is the cornerstone of security in the JMCIS environment where multiple 
segments exist together on the local area network. 
2. Integrity 
Integrity is the ability of a computer system to ensure information within the 
system cannot be changed by unauthorized users and remains uncorrupted by the system 
itself In the command and control arena, integrity is essential to the warfighter who 
depends on untainted data to make important theater battlefield decisions. 
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3. Availability 
Authorized users should never be denied service. Availability is the capacity of 
a computer system to operate efficiently and fully recover following problems or system 
outages. In a military environment, availability equals dependability, and dependability is 
critical because time can be a major factor in a commander's decision making process . 
lDATAL 
... I DATA 
I·~ 
,, 
Secrecy Integrity Availability 
Secure Data 
Figure 4-1 Characteristics of Computer Security [Ref 19:p. 9] 
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B. WHY SECURITY? 
In the context of command and control in general, and JMCIS in particular, the 
increasing demand and use of computers and local area networks has magnified the need 
for more emphasis on computer security. Over the last several years, numerous new 
computer systems have been implemented in the DoD that handle everything from 
accounting and logistic information to Top Secret Sensitive Compartmented Information 
(SCI). In a network environment, by simply logging into a terminal, a user may be able to 
access information from any machine attached to the network. The problem is obvious 
when viewed in relation to the range of classified and compartmented information 
processed on those systems. 
Another issue of computer security is the effect of vulnerabilities introduced during 
software production. A significant quantity of commercial production software is 
produced in off-shore software development facilities, many of them in foreign countries 
not necessarily friendly to the United States. It is a relatively simple process for a 
programmer to introduce malicious code into software production and then make it appear 
as normal software code. These security threats, commonly called trap doors, Trojan 
horses, and viruse:::, caH devastate a computer network and bring entire organizations 
dependent on those networks to their knees. A description of trap doors, J:rojan horses, 
and viruses are provided in the glossary. Without strict controls on either how and where 
custom software is produced or on the procurement process of commercial software, 
serious consequences await. As the trend toward increased use of open systems 
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throughout DoD continues, aggressive attention must be given to the development and 
procurement of trusted products. One defense to malicious or corrupt software is the 
National Computer Security Center's (NCSC) "Trusted Product Evaluation Program" 
which assesses commercially developed software products to ensure availability of 
dependable off-the-shelf software for use by the US. government 
C. MODES OF SECURITY 
There are three modes of operation for a computer network; dedicated, system-high, 
and multilevel, and each mode makes more refined distinctions among security parameters. 
That is, a dedicated mode network doesn't dependably distinguish between classifications 
or compartments, while a system-high network maintains separation of classifications 
solely by the need-to know parameters. Finally, a multilevel secure mode network should 
maintain divisions between need-to-know, compartments, as well as separation of data 
based on its classification. Each mode contains the characteristics of the previous mode 
and are thus successively more complicated and the risks of compromise is greater. 
[Ref 20] 
1. Dedicated Mode 
Dedicated mode is when all users with access to a computer system or network 
meet the following criteria: 
• possess a valid security clearance for all information processed on the system or any 
network attached to the system. 
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• have formal access approval (in addition to signed nondisclosure agreements) for all 
classified information (including all compartments) processed or stored. 
• have a valid need-to-know for all classified information in the system [Ref 20] 
2. System-High Mode 
System-high mode is when all users with access to a computer system or 
network meet the following criteria: 
• possess a valid security clearance for all information processed on the system or any 
network attached to the system. 
• have formal access approval (in addition to signed nondisclosure agreements) for all 
classified information (including all compartments) processed or stored. 
• have a valid need-to-know for some of the classified information in the system. 
[Ref. 20] 
3. Multilevel Mode 
Multilevel mode is when the following statements are satisfied with respect to 
the users with access to a computer system or network: 
• some users do not have a valid security clearance for all the classified information 
processed on the system. 
• all have the proper clearance and formal access approval for the classified 
information that they are to have access to. 
• all have a valid need-to-know for the classified information that they are to have 
access to. 
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• Multilevel secure mode is not normally authorized for Sensitive Compartmented 
Information (SCI) applications. [Ref 20] 
The JMCIS SCI local area network operates in the system-high security mode. 
All personnel who have access to JMCIS SCI systems are cleared for the highest 
classification and compartmentation levels of information processed, although not all of 
those personnel have the need-to-know for all of the information. 
D. EVALUATION CRITERIA FOR TRUSTED SYSTEMS 
1. Background 
The Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
(DoD TCSEC), called the "Orange Book", was created in 1985. The primary reason that 
the TCSEC was developed was the need to quantify trust or security in computer systems. 
Increasingly, government computer system procurements specify that computer 
technology meet the certification specifications of the TCSEC. The TCSEC has become 
the de facto standard for trusted systems. [Ref 21 :p. 1 04] 
Trusted, in the context of computer security is synonymous with assurance and 
is simply the confidence in the ability of a computer system to measure up to its 
specifications. While a completely secure system is unattainable, some systems provide a 
higher degree of trust than others that they will correctly implement an access control 
policy. [Ref 2l:p. 105] 
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2. Purpose 
The purpose of the criteria is to establish a set of measurable standards for 
evaluating the effectiveness of security controls built into computer systems by meeting 
three specific objectives: 
• Give vendors of commercial computer products guidance and a benchmark for 
security features required to satisfy the trust requirements for sensitive applications. 
• Provide a specific measure for the degree of trust that can be placed in a system that 
processes classified information. 
• Establish a foundation for detailing security requirements in acquisitions 
specifications. [Ref. 22:p. 2] 
3. Security Policy 
A well-defined security policy is an essential requirement for achieving 
computer security. Simply put, a security policy is the rules that a computer system uses 
to determines whether or not access to the system will be granted. [Ref. 21 :p.l 08] defines 
a security policy as: 
The set of rules and practices that regulate how an organization manages, protects 
and distributes sensitive information. It's the framework in which a system provides 
trust. A security policy is typically stated in terms of subjects and objects. A subject 
is something alive in the system; examples of subjects are users, processes, and 
programs. An object is something that a subject acts upon; examples of objects are 
files, directories, devices, sockets, and windows. 
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The TCSEC [Ref. 22:p. 3] states: 
There must be an explicit and well-defined security policy enforced by the system. 
Given identified subjects and objects, there must be a set of rules that are used by the 
system to determine whether a given subject can be permitted to gain access to a 
specific object. 
Fundamental requirements of a security policy are mandatory access control (MAC) 
and discretionary access control (DAC). 
a. Discretionary Access Control (DAC) 
In a system that processes classified information, discretionary access 
controls rules must be included in the security policy. "Discretionary security refers to a 
computer system's ability to control information on an individual basis." [Ref. 22:p. 75] 
When discretionary access control is implemented in a computer system, access to objects 
(files, directories, etc.) by subjects (users or groups) is restricted based upon the subjects 
identity and "need to know." The motive for discretionary security is that it allows the 
subject to decide on its own (discretion) what information under its control others subjects 
can access. 
Discretionary Access Control (DAC) is a means of restricting access to objects 
based on the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls 
are discretionary in the sense that a subject with certain access permission is capable 
of passing that permission (perhaps) indirectly on to any other subject (unless 
restrained by mandatory access control). [Ref. 22:p. 112] 
b. Mandatory Access Control (MAC) 
Mandatory access controls must be included in the security policy of a 
computer system that processes classified information. In contrast to discretionary access 
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control, the computer system enforcing a mandatory access control policy removes the 
discretion and makes all decisions regarding what objects a subject can access. A 
mandatory access policy restricts access to objects by comparing a subject's security 
clearance level to the label (sensitivity of the information) of the object. 
Mandatory Access Control (MAC) is a means of restricting access to objects 
based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the 
objects and the formal authorization (i.e. security clearance) of subjects to access 
information of such sensitivity. [Ref 22:p. 114] 
4. The Criteria 
There are four hierarchical divisions of security defined in the TCSEC; D, C, B, 
and A, with divisions C and B further divided into classes. The divisions and classes from 
the TCSEC are as follows: 
a. Division D: Minimal Protection 
Reserved for those systems that have been evaluated but fail to meet the 
requirements for a higher division. 
h. Division C: Discretionary Protection 
Provides discretionary (need-to-know) protection and accountability of 
subjects and actions. 
(1) Class CJ: Discretionary Security Protection 
Provides for separation of users and data and sets controls for 
enforcing individual access limitations. 
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(2) Class C2: Controlled Access Protection 
Provides finer granularity than C 1 and makes users individually 
accountable through log-in procedures, auditing of security-relevant events, and resource 
isolation. 
c. Division B: Mandatory Protection 
Establishes the use of sensitivity labels to enforce mandatory access control 
rules. Also provides the security policy model on which the Trusted Computing Base 
(TCB) is founded and furnishes a specification of the TCB. Must also show that the 
reference monitor concept has been implemented. 
(1) Class Bl: Labeled Security Protection 
Must provide an informal statement of the security policy model , data 
labeling, and mandatory access control over named subjects and objects. 
(2) Class B2: Structured Protection 
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) is based on a clearly defined and 
documented formal security policy model that requires the discretionary and mandatory 
access control enforcement found in Class B 1 systems to be extended to all subjects and 
objects. Covert channels are also addressed. Class B2 systems are relatively resistant to 
penetration. 
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(3) Class B3: Security Domains 
Must mediate all accesses of subjects to objects, be tamperproof, and 
be small enough to be subjected to analysis and tests. To accomplish this, all code not 
necessary for security policy enforcement is excluded from the TCB. Class B3 systems 
are highly resistant to penetration. 
d. Division A: Verified Protection 
Characterized by the use of formal design specification and verification 
techniques to assure that the mandatory and discretionary security controls of the TCB 
can effectively protect classified information. Figure 4-2 shows how security increases as 
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Figure 4-3 Comparison ofEvaluation Classes [Ref 22:p. 109] 
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E. COMMAND AND CONTROL SCENARIO 
The means of exploiting computer systems require relatively moderate computer 
skills and vary widely from physical sabotage of equipment to deliberate penetration 
attempts. While deliberately far-fetched, the scenario that follows illustrates how the 
successful penetration of a command and control computer system can have devastating 
consequences. This scenario has been adapted from the original article, "The Importance 
of High Assurance Computers for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence 
Systems," [Ref 24:p. 332-334]. Comparable articles can be found in [Ref 25:p. 30-32] 
and [Ref 26:p. 16] 
In 1995, the Department of Defense de.,.~loped a project to interconnect various 
legacy command and control systems located throughout the world, at sea and 
ashore, with high speed, dedicated communications links. The preexisting systems 
had been in use for several years and were therefore considered secure as they each 
nominally enforced a mandatory security policy that provided adequate protection of 
classified information. For that reason, it was estimated that there was minimal 
additional risk to security produced by the new connectivity. 
In the subsequent conventional hostilities in the Middle East, this projel.'t was 
determined to be one of the decisive elements that led to the losses suffered by the 
NATO C:llliance. Unknown to the project developers, the enemy had successfully 
placed technical saboteurs at one of the ashore sites as early as 1989. That saboteur 
had managed to penetrate the system by installing a Trojan horse to exploit a flaw in 
the command and control system. By sending an illegitimate series of instructions 
(the Trojan horse) to an l/0 device, an arbitrary memory location was modified and 
memory management access controls were circumvented. 
The Trojan horse, in the form of a virus infected graphics package, was obtained 
by a programmer working on the project from a public bulletin board system (BBS). 
Because the graphics package contained features that were needed for part of an 
application he was working on, the programmer loaded it into the command and 
control system for evaluation. After decomposing the graphics package, the 
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programmer decided it didn't satisfy the needs of the application and removed it from 
the command and control system. By this time though, the virus had become a 
permanent dweller in the command and control system. 
In a targeted attack, the Trojan horse was purposefully located on the public 
BBS. Since the system programmers were known subscribers of the BBS, the 
chances of successfully penetrating the system were high. Also, because the BBS was 
open to the public, there was very little risk of apprehension for the saboteurs even if 
the Trojan horse was eventually discovered. 
The Trojan horse had been engineered to exploit a specific defect on an identical 
computer system purchased off-the-shelf by the sabotage team in support of the 
attack. Included in the Trojan horse was the ability to accept covert software 
"upgrades" to its own program once it had installed itself Thus, after the 1tojan 
horse was installed, the saboteurs had complete access to the command and control 
system after communications with the Trojan were established. When the Trojan 
horse was initially activated, the first thing it did was notify the enemy operator as to 
its presence and location. It then relocated itself to the message processing subsystem 
where it could monitor all incoming message traffic. The Trojan horse also installed 
redundant processes in intelligent peripherals to watch for system maintenance and 
subsequent software upgrade installations, in effect assuring that the virus would 
remain in the system. The enemy then decided to forego use of the Trojan horse until 
it was militarily or diplomatically advantageous. So, for most of its life, the Trojan 
horse was inactive, and remained undetected. 
Designed to communicate with the saboteurs via unclassified message traffic, the 
enemy could send and receive routine, unclassified, administrative messages and the 
DoD communication system would ensure delivery. By sending a preselected string 
of codewords and a "program" encoded as numeric table data, the enemy operator 
could signal and control execution of the Trojan horse. The enabling trigger and 
program code were designed to imitate a routine report originating from this and 
similar ashore sites, while ensuring that the risk of the "trigger" actually occurring in a 
genuine message was low. Similarly encoded signals from the Trojan horse could be 
sent to the enemy operator. To a cursory scan, the messages appeared to be routine 
logistics accounting messages containing tabular data. 
With the intercoMection of all command and control systems, the enemy could 
now subvert the entire U.S. command and control system network. After several 
years, the enemy successfully tested the Trojan horse to verify that it still existed and 
was operational. The Trojan horse was now reprogrammed to remotely access other 
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command and control systems and execute precise intelligence and disinformation 
tasks. They were now prepared to start the war. 
The use of the Trojan horse during the war was done cautiously to avoid 
detection. The Trojan horse was used to determine allied order of battle information 
in addition to introducing small distortions to enemy track and locating data. These 
simple information modifications and alterations to system behavior were subtle 
enough to escape detection, but provided decisive intelligence and disinformation 
advantages, which are key ingredients to success on the battlefield. 
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V. SENSITIVE COMPARTMENTED 
INFORMATION (SCI) LAN SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
A. BACKGROUND 
The security requirements for the JMCIS SCI local area network are derived from 
multiple sources, but primarily from the Department of Defense Intelligence Information 
System (DoD liS) Developer's Guide which defines the fundamental security requirements 
and specific security modes of operation for SCI systems/networks. In addition, the 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC) is used to provide a general 
description of certain security requirements as listed in the Concept of Operations and 
Security Analysis Guide [Ref. 1 7]. 
B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this thesis is to provide an analysis for each of the specific security 
requirements under the broad category of Technical (Computer) Security. 
Communications Security (COMSEC) issues will not be discussed. The goal is to 
interpret the requirements and provide additional rationale for each specific requirement 
rather than critique whether the requirements have been met. The criteria established in the 
Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria (TCSEC), also called the "Orange Book" 
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or the "Criteria", and other relevant sources the author considers to be authoritative on the 
specific requirement will be used to provide the rationale for the analysis. 
C. TECHNICAL (COMPUTER) SECURITY (TEC_l.O) 
REQUIREMENTS 
1. Conceptual Design- TEC_l.l 
a. Description 
An engineering approach must be used to develop JMCIS 2.1 (SCI). 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement is included to ensure that good engineering design and 
management practices are employed in the development of both the JMCIS SCI local area 
network Common Operating Environment (COE) as well as the individual application 
segments. Included in the requirement for "an engineering approach" are consistent 
software design methodologies and the acquisition of interoperable hardware. 
Additionally, configuration management procedures are employed to manage changes to 
the JMCIS SCI local area network. Configuration management refers to the methodical 
oversight of system modifications and ensuring that the modifications take place in an 
identifiable and controlled environment. Configuration management also ensures that 
changes are not detrimental to any properties of the system or affect the security policy. 
[Ref 27:p. 3] Configuration management is defined as follows: 
The management of changes made to a system's hardware, software, firmware, 
documentation, tests, test fixtures, and test documentation throughout the development 
and operational life ofthe system. [Ref 27:p. 29] 
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2. System Architecture - TEC _1.2 
a. Description 
The Trusted Computing Base (TCB) must maintain a domain for its own 
execution that protects it from external interference or tampering. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
Prevention of modifications to the operating system code or data structures 
is the sum and substance of a trusted computer system. This requirement (TEC _1.2) 
specifies that the objects (files, directories, programs, displays, keyboards, printers, etc.) in 
the Trusted Computing Base be isolated from users and safeguarded against malicious 
threats and subversion. The TCSEC defines a Trusted Computing Base (TCB) as: 
The totality of protection mechanisms within a computer system-including 
hardware, firmware, and software--the combination of which is responsible for 
enforcing a security policy. A TCB consists of one or more components that together 
enforce a unified security policy over a product or system. The ability of a TCB to 
correctly enforce a security policy depends solely on the mechanisms within the TCB 
and on the correct input by system administrative personnel of parameters (e.g., a user's 
clearance) related to the security policy. [Ref 22:p. 116] 
Since the .JMCIS SCI local area network does not employ a trusted operating 
system at this time, the ability to meet this requirement (TEC _1.2) depends upon the basic 
security functions of the UNIX operating system, the hardware platform (DTC-2 or 
TAC-3), and the JMCIS Security Shell. The Security Shell prevents any user from having 
access to the operating system by restricting activity to general menu items and windows. 
The Security Manager specifies the level of access based upon the Account Group and 
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Role of the user, where the Account Groups pennit access to specific applications and the 
Roles convey specific functionality within the applications. [Ref 28:p. 21] Although the 
current mechanisms may help prevent accidental misuse, they do little to prevent direct 
probing, direct penetration, or subversion of the security mechanism. Figure 5-l 
illustrates the Add Account Window used to enter new users into the system. 
LOGIN NAJ\ffi ......................... . 
DESCRIPTION ......................... . 
PASSVVOBUJ ......................... . 
iBI ROLE .......................... . 
-- ACCOUNT GROUPS---, 
(i) JMCIS 
0 System Admin 
0 Security Admin 
Oroot 
Figure 5-1 Add Account Window [Ref 28:p. 21] 
3. Discretionary Access Control - TEC _1.3 
a. Description 
JMCIS 2.1 (SCI) must enforce need-to-know. 
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b. Interpretation and Rationale 
Limiting access predicated by the identity and need-to know of the user is 
called Discretionary Access Control (DAC). In a DAC environment, the user (subject) 
with permission to access specific objects may have the discretion to pass that permission 
to other subjects. [Ref 29:p. 14] Discretionary control is the most common type of 
access control mechanism implemented in computer systems today. The discretionary 
security control objective is: 
Security policies defined for systems that are used to process classified or other 
sensitive information must include provisions for the enforcement of discretionary 
access control rules. That is, they must include a consistent set of rules for controlling 
and limiting access based on identified users who have been determined to have 
need-to-know for the information. [Ref 30:p. 2] 
SECNA VINST 5239.2 defines need-to-know as: 
A determination made in the interest of U.S. national security by the custodian of 
classified or sensitive unclassified information, that a prospective recipient has a 
requirement for access to, knowledge of, or possession of the information to perform 
official tasks or services. [Ref 15] 
Need-to-know in the SCI local area network environment is controlled by 
the Security Manager based upon a user's actual operational role to be performed. The 
Security Shell provides the functionality to control user access by role, granularity of 
access within a role, and information required to meet operational needs. [Ref 17:p. 27] 
In this arrangement, a user may copy an object and pass it to another user, but access 
cannot be granted to others directly. This is called administratively controlled 
Discretionary Access Control. 
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4. Identification and Authentication - TEC 1.4 
a. Description 
Access must be controlled on the basis of unique User ID authenticated by password. For 
each AIS connected to the LAN, authentication data must be maintained and protected for 
every user. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
The process of identification and authentication begins with the login 
(identification) which establishes a communications path between the user and the system. 
After the communication path is set up, the user identifies himself(authentication). 
[Ref 30:p. 4] Use of passwords is the most common form of authentication. For Class 
C2 level Controlled Access Protection the TCSEC states: 
The discretionary access control mechanism shall, either by explicit user action or 
default, provide that objects are protected from unauthorized access. These access 
controls shall be capable of including or excluding access to the granularity of a single 
user. Access permission to an object by users not already possessing access permission 
shall only be assigned by authorized users. [Ref 22:p. 15] 
and further: 
The TCB shall require users to identify themselves to it before beginning to 
perform any other actions that the TCB is expected to mediate. Furthermore, the TCB 
shall use a protection mechanism (e.g., passwords) to authenticate the user's identity. 
[Ref. 22:p. 16] 
In the JMCIS SCI environment, as each new user account is created by the 
Security Manager, a unique User Identification and password is established. User 
Account information and authentication data is maintained in the SECMAN account which 
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is not accessible by users. Users can only perform functions defined for their respective 
roles. 
5. Single User ID- TEC_1.4.1 
a. Description 
Each user must have a single, constant User ID regardless oflogged on role. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
The audit requirement reinforces the demand for individual identity. This 
allows all users to be audited by the System Administrator based on their individual 
identity. The "Guide to Understanding Identification and Authentication in Trusted 
Systems" states: 
Identification and Authentication (I&A) must distinguish operators, system 
administrators, and system security officers from ordinary users in order to record 
security related events as actions initiated by the individuals performing those roles. 
Since individuals performing those roles may be ordinary users of the system, it is 
necessary to distinguish the people when acting as ordinary users. [Ref 31 :p. 13] 
6. Password Length - TEC _1.4.2 
a. Description 
Minimum password length must be eight alphanumeric characters. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
A password should be difficult to predict, a mixture of alphabetic and 
numeric characters, upper and lower case, and at least eight characters long. Picking a 
password that meets these characteristics will decrease the chances of successfully 
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guessing by those with malicious intent. The Appendix provides a detailed explanation of 
the mathematics involved in establishing password length. [Ref 32:p. 17] 
7. Privileged User Limitation- TEC_1.5 
a. Description 
Number of logged on users must be limited to one privileged user per role at 
a time. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement has been modified by the Certification Authority in 
response to the operational need for multiple privileged users to be logged-on at the same 
time. For example, onboard ship, 24 hour a day operations are the norm and due to time 
constraints, two privileged users may be required to be working at the same time. 
8. Role Change - TEC _1.6 
a. Description 
Role changes must be allowed "on the fly" (e.g., change user role without 
need to log off and log back on). 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement doesn't apply to any specific threat or vulnerability. It is 
simply an efficiency measure to allow users with multiple role accounts to move back and 
forth between roles without being required to log out from one account and then log back 
in the other account. An example might be the Information System Security Officer 
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(ISSO) who is also an analyst. [Ref 17:p. 28] In an open environment, using an 
untmsted path, if passwords are used to make the role changes, users could be spoofed 
and the passwords for privileged roles could be captured. Once JMCIS migrates to a 
trusted operating system, this will solve the issue for the GENSER local area network as 
well as provide further assurance for the SCI local area network. 
9. Data Base Manager Role- TEC_1.7 
a. Description 
A Data Base Manager Role must be created to limit access to DBMS 
privileged functions. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
The integrity of the data in a Data Base Management System is the core of 
any system that permits users from different systems to share access to common data. In a 
command and control environment, where information is vital to significant decision 
making, data is a major asset and its consistency and integrity determine its value to the 
warfighter. The requirement for a Data Base Manager Role ensures Cf1ntrolled access to 
the database, which prevents unauthorized and untrained users to view data ard decreases 
the chances of accidental or malicious modifications to the database. 
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10. Menu Item Gray-Out - TEC _1.8 
a. Description 
Menu items that are not valid selections for function being perfonned must 
be grayed-out or not displayed in menu. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement was created as a visual indication for individual users 
attempting to access menu items to which they are not authorized or cannot be executed 
for the specific function attempted. [Ref 17:p. 29] This is somewhat analogous to the 
Data Base Managr .nent System (DBMS) projections in the Hinke-Schaefer architecture, 
that is, you don't see what you don't have access to and users don't even know that the 
field exists. [Rtf 33] 
11. Aud1t- TEC 1.9 
a. De~·cription 
An aud:t record must be m~.tained for AIS/network/user activity to permit 
regular or on-demand s.~curity review~,. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
The process of recording, inspecting, and evaluating any or all 
security-gennane activities on a secure system is the process of auditing. The audit record 
is the primary means of monitoring user activity and piecing together the facts following a 
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security violation. The TCSEC defines an Audit Trail as: 
A set of records that collectively provide documentary evidence of processing used 
to aid in tracing from original trallS.'!!·.;tions forward to related records and reports, 
and/or backwards from records and reports to their component source transactions. 
[Ref 22:p. 111] 
The purpose of the Audit Mechanism is described as follows: 
The audit mechanism of a computer system has five important security goals. 
First, the audit mechanism must "allow the review of patterns of access to individual 
objects, access histories of specific processes and individuals, and the use of the various 
protection mechanisms supported by the system and their effectiveness." Second, the 
audit mechanism must allow discovery of both users' and outsiders' repeated attempts 
to bypass the protection mechanisms. Third the audit mechanism must allow discovery 
of any use of privileges that may occur when a user assumes a functionality with 
privileges greater than his or her own, i.e., programmer to administrator. In this case 
there may be no bypass of security controls but nevertheless a violation is made 
possible. Fourth, the audit mechanism must act as a deterrent against perpetrators' 
habitual attempts to bypass the system protection mechanisms.. However, to act as a 
deterrent, the perpetrator must be aware of the audit mechanism's existence and its 
active use to detect any attempts to bypass system protection mechanisms. The fifth 
goal of the audit protection mechanism is to supply "an additional form of user 
assurance that attempts to bypass the protection mechanisms are recorded and 
discovered." Even if the attempt to bypass the protection mechanism is successful, the 
audit trail will still provide assurance by its ability to aid in assessing the damage done 
by the violation, thus improving the system's ability to control the damage. 
[Ref 34:p. 5] 
12. Minimum Audit Data- TEC_1.9.1 
a. Description 
At a minimum, audit data must include User ID, Terminal ID, date, time, 
type of event, and success or failure of the event. Minimum audit events include: logon, 
logoff, application (menu item) access, file export to media or printer, file 
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creation/moditi-..!tion/deletion for user created /accessed files (e.g. messages), all actions 
by privileged users, STU-rn (JDISS) time of call and external station's address. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
The minimum required audit data provides the auditor with the pertinent 
information necessary to reconstruct an event. Figure 5-2 illustrates the Security Audit 
Log which is created for each workstation on the SCI local area network. A similar log is 
created for auditing events in the operating system and is called the Operating System 
(OS) Audit Log. 
DTG W/S USER GRAN LEVEL APP AUDIT EVENT 
131435:04Z Aug 94 jots3 sso CRITICAL sso Logged In 
131434:59Z Aug 94 jots3 root CRITICAL sso Logged Out 
131434:04Z Aug 94 jots3 root CRITICAL sso Logged In 
131433:37Z Aug 94 jots3 ntcs CRITICAL sso Logged Out 
101715:15Z Aug 94 jots3 ntcs CRITICAL sso Logged In 
101715:09Z Aug 94 jots3 seeman CRITICAL sso Logged Out 
101713:16Z Aug 94 jots3 seeman CRITICAL sso Logged In 
101713:07Z Aug 94 jots3 jotsii CRITICAL sso Logged Out 
101711:30Z Aug 94 jots3 jotsii CRITICAL sso Logged In 
101711:14Z Aug 94 jots3 seeman CRITICAL sso Logged Out 
101710:37Z Aug 94 jots3 seeman CRITICAL sso Logged In 
Figure 5-2 Security Audit Log [Ref 28:p. 7] 
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13. Audit User Role - TEC 1.9.2 
a. Description 
The user role must be identified in audit records. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
Since users can have multiple roles within the JMCIS environment, it is 
necessary for the audit records to include information regarding the specific role a user is 
operating in to maintain a complete audit trail. 
14. Audit Unsuccessful Log-on Attempts- TEC_l.9.3 
a. Description 
Each unsuccessful log-on attempt must be entered in the audit record. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
Auditing of unsuccessful logon attempts is important to determine malicious 
attempts to break in to the system. In addition, if users are notified of unsuccessful logon 
attempts with their own identification (ID), they can determine that another user has 
attempted to use their ID and the Security Manager can be notified. This might enable 
notification of malicious attempts to break in to the system prior to regular audit review. 
This requirement will not be fulfilled until the JMCIS SCI local area network migrates to a 
trusted operating system. [Ref 17:p. 29] 
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15. Message Handling Audit- TEC_1.9.4 
a. Description 
JMCIS 2.1 (SCI) must maintain a record of all messages received and 
released. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
The ability to track incoming and outgoing messages is essential to 
maintaining a complete audit trail. The JMCIS SCI local area network records messages 
in several formats and include: Incoming Message Log (ll...OG), the Incoming Message 
Catalog, the Outgoing Message Log (OLOG), and the Outgoing Message Catalog. These 
logs, when used in combination with the audit records, provide a thorough record of use~ 
activity. [Ref 17:p. 29] 
16. Log-on Alarm- TEC_l.10 
a. Description 
An alarm must be generated upon three successive unsuccessful log-on 
attempts. (Optimally, tenninallocks with unlock possible only by security officer.) 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement provides an audible alert that a user has unsuccessfully 
attempted to access the system and should be investigated. While the problem may be no 
more than simply typing in the authorized password incorrectly three times, it could also 
be an unauthorized user trying to logon or a user attempting to access an account or role 
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to which they are unauthorized. Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) in most JMCIS 
SCI local area network installations apply the "Two-Man Rule", which means that two 
people are required in the facility or spaces at all times. The result is that all user activity 
is directly observable by at least one other user. In addition, in a System-High 
environment, unauthorized personnel are prevented from even accessing the spaces. 
17. Marking Printed Output- TEC_l.ll 
a. Description 
JMCIS 2.1 (SCI) must comply with appropriate directives for the mode of 
operation. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement is necessary to ensure that all material is printed with the 
propP.r cJassification level to prevent unauthorized disclosure and compromise of cJassified 
information. Human-readable sensitivity labels equal to at least the highest classification 
level and compartmentation will, by default, be placed at the top and bottom of each page 
of printed output to ensure that anyone viewing the material recognizes the classification 
level of the content. [Ref 22:p. 22] Prior to release of printed material outside the 
JMCIS SCI System-High environment, the printed material is physically sanitized to the 
classification level at which it is being released. [Ref 17:p. 30] 
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18. Object Reuse- TEC 1.12 
a. Description 
Authorization to infonnation within a storage object must be revoked prior 
to initial assignment, allocation, or reallocation to a subject from the TCB's pool of unused 
storage objects. No infonnation including encrypted representations, produced by a prior 
subject is to be available to any subject that obtains access to an object that has been 
released back to the system. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
Object reuse is a TCSEC Class C2 requirement and is defined by the Guide 
to Understanding Data Remanence in Automated Information Systems as: 
The reassignment to some subject of storage medium (e.g., page frame, disk 
sector, magnetic tape) that contained one or more objects. To be securely reassigned, 
no residual data can be available to the new subject through standard system 
mechanisms. [Ref 35:p. 9] 
This requirement simply means that a user who is issued memory space or 
storage should not have access to infonnation previously placed in the storage location, 
regardless of whether the space was fonnerly allocated to another user or the current 
subject. The goal of Object Reuse is to prevent the leak of classified or sensitive 
infonnation to untrusted users with access to storage objects in the JMCIS SCI local area 
network. While not protecting specifically against physical attacks on the system (e.g., 
using sophisticated equipment or software to recover residual infonnation from memory 
or disk drives), Object Reuse prevents users (authorized and unauthorized) from browsing 
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or scavenging through the system looking for interesting items. The Guide to 
Understanding Object Reuse in Trusted Systems calls this the "equivalent of rummaging 
through the trash" [Ref 36:p. 3]. 
19. Identification of User Terminal- TEC 1.13 
a. Description 
DCID 1116 Requirement. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement follows the same reasoning as that from the previously 
discussed audit criteria. Identification of the specific user terminal in the audit data 
provides another piece of the required audit trail to track and reconstruct use of the 
system. 
20. Automated Guard Processors and Filters- TEC 1.14 
a. Description 
Automated guards or filters must satisfy certain criteria for proper filtering 
of data streams. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
Before interpreting the requirement for Guard Processors and Filters, the 
distinction between the two should be made. The basic idea that follows, regarding Guards 
and Filters, is attributable to Dr. Roger Shell. A Filter simply looks at the data from a 
System-High environment to determine if it contains any of the classified words or 
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combinations of classified words, called "dirty words", in its reterence database. If the 
data does contains any "dirty words", the filter sanitizes the data to a lower classification 
level and passes it on to a network of a lower Ievei of classification. In the JMCIS 
environment the SCI local area network passes information to be transmitted to the Filter, 
in this case either the Esprit sanitizer or eventually, the Radiant Mercury interface. The 
information is then sanitized or downgraded and then passed on to the GENSER local 
area network. In the case of a Guard, the data is passed from one computer network to 
thc. guard, cryptosealed, and passed on to another secure computer network. 
21. System Integrity- TEC_l.15 
a. Description 
Hardware or software features must be provided that can be used 
periodically to validate correct operation of hardware and firmware elements of the TCB. 
Features must be included that mandate loading of the security shell and prevents 
deactivation/deletion of shell. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This feature is essential to ensure that the TCB is operating properly. 
Routine diagnostics are performed at system boot-up to test both hardware and software 
availability and operation. When the JMCIS SCI and Unified Build software is installed, 
the Security Shell is a mandatory installation item. On SCI local area network specifically, 
the workstation and user classifications remain at the network System-High classification 
level and cannot be changed, disabled, or deleted, even by the Security Manager. 
71 
[Ref 28:p. 13] In addition to routine testing performed by the operating system, trusted 
recovery following system failure or emergency system shutdown is essential in restoring 
the system to a known trusted state. 
22. Protection of Network Control- TEC 1.16 
a. Description 
The integrity of user identification and other security related information 
provided to remote hosts must be assured by appropriate means. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement ensures that both user specific information as well as 
security information reach the remote host in the same form as that transmitted without 
any degradation or corruption. The Transmission Control Protocol and Internet Protocol 
{TCPIIP), which provide for reliable data transfer and packet flow (checksums are used to 
check for damaged packets), are the standard protocols used in the JMCIS environment. 
Another view of this requirement comes from the term 11trusted path11 , which expanded to 
encompass the path between distributed systems (remote hosts), simply means that the 
communications path is logically isolated and unmistakably distinguishable from other 
paths. [Ref 22:p. 108] The article, .. The Architecture of a Distributed Trusted 
Computing Base", contends that a trusted path offers the following guarantees: 
a. A message received from a trusted path originates from a trusted source. This 
property can be supported in stronger form by authentication of the exact identity and 
security attributes of the originating component. 
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b. A message received from a trusted path contains the same value that was sent. 
This guarantees that message data have not been modified by untrusted entities. 
c. If messages have security labels, then the label on a received message has the 
same value as that was sent. This guarantees that message labels have not been 
modified by untrusted entities. 
d. An optional property is the preservation of message order on pairwise trusted 
paths. (This property also prevents replay of messages.) It is optional because it may 
be expensive to implement and difficult to verify. Further, it may not be required to 
support Trusted Computing Base (TCB) correctness. [Ref 37:p. 70] 
23. Integrity of Intelligence Data - TEC _1.17 
a. Description 
The network interface components must assure the integrity of intelligence 
they transmit. 
h. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement ensures that information is accurately transmitted from 
source to destination and is referred to as data integrity. The Transmission Control 
Protocol and Internet Protocol (TCPIIP), which provide for reliable data transfer and 
packet flow (checksums are used to check for damaged packets), are the standard 
protocols used in the JMCIS environment. There are various threats to communications 
integrity that include jamming/spoofing attacks, line and node outages, hardware and 
software failures, and actual active wiretapping attacks. To combat these threats, effective 
countermeasures must exist and that is the substance of this requirement (TEC _1.17). 
The countermeasures may include policy, procedures, automated or physical controls, 
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mechanisms, and various protocol means that ensure data has not been subject to 
excessive random errors and unauthorized message stream modification (MSM) such as 
alteration, substitution, reordering, replay, or insertion. The Trusted Network 
Interpretation (TNI) states: 
When ciphers are used in networks, it is combined with network protocols to 
protect against unauthorized data modification. The strength of the ciphers, the 
correctness of the protocol logic, and the adequacy of implementation are three primary 
factors in assessing the strength of Data Integrity using cryptography techniques. 
[Ref 38:p. 182] 
24. Security Markings For Exported Intelligence- TEC_1.18 
a. Description 
Every AIS must be able to provide, either explicitly or implicitly, security . 
parameters for the intelligence it stores and processes. Such parameters must be reliably 
associated with other AISs. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement ensures that any information exported to other networks is 
of at least the same level of classification as the exporting system. This prevents 
unauthorized disclosures or compromises to systems and users not cleared for the level of 
information from the exporting system. 
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25. Security Testing- TEC_l.l9 
a. Description 
TCSEC requirement covers testing of security mechanisms prior to 
certification of test. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
The TCSEC defines security testing as: 
A process used to determine that the security features of a system are implemented 
as designed and that they are adequate for a proposed application environment. This 
process also includes hands-on functional testing, penetration testing, and verification. 
[Ref 22:p. 115] 
In accordance with good engineering practices, all security features including the Security 
Shell are rigorously tested to determine both functionality and ability to migrate to the 
JMCIS environment. Testing is done both during development by the developer and again 
at the Naval Research and Development (NRaD) facility in conjunction with integration to 
JMCIS. The JMCIS SCI Concept of Operations and Security Analysis document 
specifies that: 
A Security Certification Test, under the direction of the Certification Authority, of 
JMCIS 2.1 (SCI) will be performed in the NRaD System Integration Laboratory. The 
purpose of this test is twofold: 1, certification of JMCIS 2.1 (SCI) as installed for 
integration at NRaD; and 2, it serves as a pretest of the architecture, functionality, and 
security of JMCIS 2.1 (SCI) prior to its installation at operational locations. While the 
physical configuration is different, the system architecture, hardware components, and 
software in the integration laboratory is identical to that which will be installed at 
operational locations. [Ref 17:p. 33] 
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26. Trusted Operating System - TEC _1.20 
a. Description 
Migrate to a Trusted Operating System for JMCIS SCI. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
Before discussing a Trusted Operating System, some background 
information is provided. The reference monitor concept was introduced to information 
system design to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure of information from one 
security level to another. The reference monitor concept is basically an abstract access 
mediation mechanism between subjects and objects that controls access by referencing an 
authorization database. The implementation of the reference monitor is called the security 
kernel. The security kernel and the operating system must be protected within the 
boundary of what is called the Trusted Computing Base (TCB). An operating system is 
called trusted when all operating system actions are properly mediated through the 
security kernel. The key reason for implementation of a Trusted Operating System is the 
necessity for guarding against malicious software as well as direct penetration attempts 
and other subversion threats. Implementing a Trusted Operating System is relevant 
because mediation of access between users and objects is essential in enforcing a unified 
security policy. 
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27. DoD Banner- TEC_l.21 
a. Description 
The DoD interest system banner must be presented to each user upon logon. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
This requirement was established as a visual indication to users that they are 
accessing a DoD computer system when they logon. This is just a simple reminder that 
enforces security at the conscious level and acts as a deterrent in warning users that all 
actions are monitored and audited. 
28. Session Security Parameter- TEC_l.22 
a. Description 
A control feature, such as a security session parameter, must be provided for 
each exchange of intelligence by AISs, according to each ofthe four modes of operation. 
b. Interpretation and Rationale 
Since the JMCIS SCI local area network operates in the System-High 
mode, all exchanges of intelligence are treated as if they were at the highest classified, 
most sensitive level in the system. The System-High mode is when all users with access to 
a computer system or network meet the following criteria: 
• possess a valid security clearance for all information processed on the system or any 
network attached to the system. 
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• have formal access approval (in addition to signed nondisclosure agreements) for 
all classified information (including all compartments) processed or stored. 
• have a valid need-to-know for some of the classified information in the system. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
The primary goal of this thesis was to analyze the various security requirements 
established for the Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) Sensitive 
Compartmented Information (SCI) local area network. While the security requirements 
for the JMCIS SCI local area network are derived primarily from the Department of 
Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) Developer's Guide, a different outlook 
was desired for this analysis. Therefore, to approach the security requirements from 
another perspective, the criteria set forth in the Trusted Computer Systems Evaluation 
Criteria (TCSEC) as well as other established and authoritative standards were employed 
to survey and describe the requirements. There are several broad areas of security in the 
JMCIS SCI local area network but this thesis examined the Technical (Computer) 
Security Requirements exclusively. 
Another purpose of the thesis was to convey an awareness of the significant 
complexities involved in establishing security requirements in an environment designed to 
process Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). Foremost in the minds of those 
developing secure systems is the issue of adequate security protection. That is, is there a 
threat and if so, is the system adequately protected? If a system is developed completely 
in a trusted environment, the risk of subversion as a result of people with malicious intent 
79 
is reduced. In contrast, a system developed even partially in an untrusted environment can 
bring with it a much larger set of problems as seen in the command and control scenario 
described in Chapter IV. Many of the threats and wlnerabilities to computer system 
security are avoided in the SCI environment simply by making the security mode 
System-High. In a System-High environment, where all those with access hold a security 
clearance for aU of the information processed in the system, physical access to both the 
spaces and the network itselfby unauthorized personnel is prohibited ... As a result, the risk 
of compromise or unauthorized disclosure is minimized considerably over that of the 
GENSER local area network where the environment is more open and limiting access is 
much more difficult. 
Implementation of the System-High mode of security has its drawbacks as well. In 
this environment, computer security as enforced is inherent primarily in the architectural 
design of the facility rather than in hardware or software controls. As a result, it becomes 
easy to fall back on the notion that simply due to the System-High mode, security is more 
or less invoked as a matter of policy. Fortunately, in the design of the JMCIS SCI local 
area network, significant emphasis and forethought have been provided by the developers 
to secure a high level of assurance that system security will be enforced. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The results of the security requirements analysis of the JMCIS SCI local area 
network support the prerequisites for accreditation of an SCI system in a System-High 
environment. As the evolution of JMCIS proceeds into the Global Command and Control 
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System (GCCS), there are several deferred requirements that those concerned with the 
development of the Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) section of the 
architecture should remain cognizant of and push for compliance. A b.~ef discussion of 
selected deferred requirements will follow with appropriate recommendations. 
1. TEC_1.2 and TEC_1.20 
The TEC _1.2 security requirement description is that the Trusted Computing 
Base (TCB) must maintain a domain for its own execution that protects it from external 
interference or tampering. The description ofTEC_1.20 is to migrate to a Trusted 
Operating System for JMCIS SCI. 
These two requirements are related in that they are both concerned with the 
TCB. The implementation of requirement TEC _1.20 would, by implication, fullfil the 
requirement of TEC _1.2. The. key reason for implementation of a Trusted Operating 
System is the necessity for guarding against malicious software as well as direct 
penetration attempts and other subversion threats. Currently, the TCB consists only of the 
untrusted UNIX operating system security features and the SCI Security Shell. While the 
operating system security features and the SCI Security Shell may preclude accidental 
misuse, they don't provide much assurance against intentional subversion. 
While the System-High security mode provides a physical security barrier, 
implementation of a Trusted Operating System would provide enforcement of the access 
control policy within the computer and thus more assurance that the system is 
subversion-resistant. Migration to a Trusted Operating System should remain a high 
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priority. It should be noted that because of the distributed nature of this system, the 
Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) [Ref 38] as well as the TCSEC will be applicable 
for an assessment of the security policy enforcement mechanism. 
2. TEC 1.9.3 and TEC 1.10 
TEC _1. 9. 3 requires that all unsuccessful logon attempts be entered in the audit 
record and TEC _1. 1 0 requires that an alarm be generated after three unsuccessful logon 
attempts. These two requirements are discussed together because monitoring 
unsuccessful attempts to logon to the system is an essential security feature in a trusted 
system. TEC_l.9.3 and TEC_l.IO do not currently comply and are deferred until the SCI 
local area network migrates to a trusted operating system. 
Auditing of unsuccessful logon attempts is essential in establishing a trail of 
records that aid monitoring user activity, especially following a security violation. The 
ability of a system to provide a complete audit trail is a significant deterrent to malicious 
probing. An audible alarm generated after unsuccessfullogons is also a deterrent to 
malicious attempts to break-in to a system. In the SCI environment, most facilities require 
the "Two-Man Rule" which decreases the hazard of users attempting to logon to another 
account. Nevertheless, monitoring unsuccessfullogons is an important aspect of 
computer security and these two requirements should be implemented as soon as possible. 
3. TEC 1.12 
TEC 1.12 concerns object reuse and is a fundamental TCSEC requirement for 
Class C2 systems. 
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Object reuse concerns information left in a memory storage location. The 
TCSEC requirement is that no user should have access to information previously put in a 
memory storage location. This is a significant requirement because it prevents users from 
having access to information for which they don't have formal clearance for or the 
appropriate need-to-know. Since this is another feature provided by the operating system, 
this requirement cannot be implemented until the SCI local area network migrates to a 
Trusted Operating System. 
4. TEC 1.16 
The TEC _1.16 requirement, Protection of Network Control, requires that the 
integrity of user identification and other security related information provided to remote 
hosts must be assured by appropriate means. Because the JMCIS SCI LAN is a network, 
concepts from the Trusted Network Interpretation (TNI) [Ref 38] are applicable in order 
to provide a coherent level of assurance for the system. An analysis of the system from 
the distributed Trusted Computing Base (TCB) perspective will identify that a trusted path 
between distributed elements of the partitioned TCB is necessary. Communications 
Security (COMSEC) techniques may be appropriate to address this requirement. 
The results of this thesis' analysis support the established security requirements in 
general, but the migration of the JMCIS SCI local area network to a Trusted Operating 
System should be a high priority. 
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APPENDIX 
A. DETERMINING PASSWORD LENGTH 
The security afforded by passwords is determined by the probability that a password 
can be guessed during its lifetime. The smaller that probability, the greater the security 
provided by the password. All else bein~ equal, the longer the password, the greater the 
security it provides. This appendix reviews the mathematics involved in establishing how 
long a password should be. 
The basic parameters that affect the length of the password needed to provide a 
given degree of security are: 
L = maximum lifetime that a password can be used to log into the system. 
P = probability that a password can be guessed within its lifetime, assuming 
continuous guesses for this period. 
R = number of guesses per unit of time that it is possible to make. 
S = password space, i.e., the total number of unique passwords that the password 
generation algorithm can generate. 
1. Relationship 
Considering only the cases where S is greater than L x R and therefore P is less 
This entire Appendix was taken from Appendix C of the Password Management 
Guideline [Ref 32:p. 17]. 
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than 1, the rdationship between these parameters is expressed by the equation: 
P _LxR 
- s 
2. Guess Rate 
Several factors contribute to the rate at which attempts can be made to gain 
access to the data on a system when a valid password is not known. First and foremost is 
the protection given to the password database itself If the password database is 
unprotected (i.e., can be read by anyone as ordinary data), then "guessing" may not be 
required. 
If the password database can be read, but the passwords are encrypted, a very 
high guess rate may be possible by using a computer to try a dictionary cf possible 
passwords to see if ciphertext can be generated that is the same as on in the password 
database. A similar situation frequently occurs where only passwords are used to protect 
files. 
Finally, if the password database has effective access controls and the login 
procedure cannot be bypassed , the guess rate can be controlled by setting limits on the 
number of login or other attempts that can be made before terminating the connection or 
process. 
3. Password Lifetime 
All other things being equal, the shorter the lifetime of a password, the fewer 
the number of guesses that can be made and thus the greater the degree of password 
security. The maximum password lifetime should not exceed one year. 
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4. Password Space 
Password length and alphabet size are factors in computing the maximum 
password space requirements. The following equation expresses the relationship between 
S, A, and M where: 
S = password space 
A = number of alphabet symbols 
M = password length 
To illustrate: If passwords consisting of four digits using an alphabet of 10 digits (e.g., 
0-9) are to be generated: 
That is, 10,000 unique 4-digit passwords could be generated. Likewise, to generate 
random 6-character passwords from an alphabet of26 characters (e.g., A-Z): 
s = 266 
That is 3.089 * 108 unique 6-character passwords could be generated. 
"User friendly" passwords (so-netimes referred to as passphrases) could be generated by 
using, for example, 3 symbols from an alphabet (dictionary) of2000 symbols, where each 
symbol was a pronounceable word of 4, 5, or 6 characters. Using the previous equation 
and setting: 
A = 2000 symbols (words) 
M=3 
then S = 20003 
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That is. 8 * 109 unique passwords could be generated where each password was made up 
of 3 words taken from a dictionary of 2000 words. 
5. Procedure For Determining Password Length 
What is important in using passwords is how long to make the password to 
resist exhaustive penetration attacks. There are several procedures for determining 
acceptable length as follows: 
a. Establish an acceptable probability, P, that a password will be guessed 
during its lifetime. For example, when used as a login authenticator, the probability may 
be no more than 1 in 1,000,000. In another case, where very sensitive data is involved, 
-20 the value for P may be set at 1 0 . 
b. Solve for the size of the password space, S, with the equation P = ~R 
where S = G and G = LxR p 
c. Determine the length of the password, M, from the equation 
M = LogS 
log (number of symbols in the "alphabet") 
M will generally be a real number that must be rounded up or down to the nearest whole 
number. 
6. Example of Password Length Determination 
The problem is to determine the needed password length to reduce to an 
acceptable level the probability that a password will be guessed during its lifetime. The 
network to which this is applied supports a 300 baud service. Experiments on the 
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network have determined that it is possible to make about 8.5 guesses per minute. An 
arbitrary value of I 0-6 is used for the probability, P, of guessing the password in its 
lifetime (as long as the password is changed at least once per year, the password lifetime IS 
not a critical factor). 
The statement of the problem is to find a password length that will resist being 
guessed with a probability of 1 in 106 in 1 year of continuous guesses. When three 
parameters in the following equation are known, the fourth value can be found: P = Lx:. 
The following parameters are given: 
L is set for 6 months and 12 months. 
P is set for 1 in 1,000,000 (acceptable probability of guessing the password). 
R is set at 8.5 guesses per minute. 
At 8.5 guesses per minute, the number of guesses per day would be 12,240. Substituting 
183 days for 6 months g~ves: 
G s =- = p 
12 183 x 12240 = 2.23992 x 10 passwords 
.000001 
The 12-month value is twice that of the 6-month case. 
With this data and using the equation: 
M= LogS 
log (number of symbols in the "alphabet") 
the length of the passwords as a function of the size of the alphabet from which they are 
drawn can be determined. Assume two alphabet sizes; a 26-letter alphabet and a 
36-letter-and-number alphabet. 
p M = log (2.23992 x 10 · J = 8.72 (for 6-month lifetime) 
log 26 
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M = loa (4.4676 x 1012) = 8.94 (for 12-month lifetime) 
log26 
M = IQ& (2 23292 ~ 1012) = 7.93 (for 6-month lifetime) 
log 36 
M 12 = IQ&(4,4f276~ 10 ) = 8.13 (for 12-month lifetime) 
log 36 
Table 1 presents the results. 
TABLE 1 
MAXIMUM Length ofPassword 
LIFETIME 
(months) 26-Character Alphabet 36-Character Alphabet 
6 9 8 
(rounded up from 8.72) (rounded up from 7.93) 
12 9 8 
(rounded up from 8.94) (rounded down from 8. 13) 
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LIST OF ACRONYMS 
ACL - Access Control List 
ADP - Automatic Data Processing 
AIS - Automated Information System 
API - Application Programmer Interface 
ASWOC - Anti-Submarine Warfare Operations Center (now TSC) 
CCC - CINC Command Center 
CINC - Command In Chief 
COE - Common Operating Environment 
COMSEC - Communications Security 
COTS - Commercial Off-The-Shelf Software 
CT APS - Contingency Theater Automated Planning System 
DAC - Discretionary Access Control 
DBMS - Data Base Management System 
DoD - Department of Defense 
DoDIIS - Department ofDefense Intelligence Information System 
EWCM- Electronic Warfare Coordination Module 
GOTS - Government Off-The-Shelf Software 
JDISS - Joint Defense Intelligence Support Services 
94 
JMCIS- Joint Maritime Command Information System 
JOTS - Join! Operational Tactical System 
LAN- Local Area Network 
MAC - Mandatory Access Control 
NALCOMIS- Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System 
NA VSSI - Navigation Sensor System Interface 
NCCS-A - Navy Command and Control System - Ashore 
NIPS- NTCS-A Intelligence Processing System 
NITES- NTCS-A Integrated Tactical Environmental Subsystem 
NTCB- Network Trusted Computing Base 
NTCCS - Navy Tactical Command Support System 
NTCS-A - Navy TacticaJ Command and Control System - Afloat 
NWSS - Navy WWMCCS Software Standardization 
OSS- Operations Support System 
R TE - Runtime Environment 
SNAP - Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program 
TCB- Trusted Computer Base 
TCSEC- Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria 
IDA- Tactical Decision Aid 
TIMS- Tactical Information Management System 
TSC - Tactical Support Center (formerly ASWOC) 
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UB- Unified Build 
WWMCCS- W~rld Wide Military Command Center System 
96 
GLOSSARY 
Access - ( 1) A specific type of interaction between a subject and an object that results in 
the flow of information from one to the other. (2) The ability and the means necessary 
approach, to store or retrieve data., to communicate with, or to make use of any resource 
of an ADP system. 
Access Control - ( 1) The limiting of rights or capabilities of a subject to communicate with 
other subjects, or to use functions or services in a computer system or network. (2) 
Restrictions controlling a subject's access to an object. 
Access Control List- (I) A list of subjects authorized for specific access to an object. (2) 
A list of entities, together with their access rights, which are authorized to have access to 
a resource. 
Accountability- The quality or state which enables action~ on an ADP system to be traced 
to individuals who may then be held responsible. These acttons include violations and 
attempted violations of the security policy, as well as allowed actions. 
Accreditation - the managerial authorization and approval, granted to an ADP system or 
network to process sensitive data in an operational environment, make on the basis of a 
certification by designated technical personnel of the extent to which design and 
implementation of the system meet pre-specified technical requirements, e.g., TCSEC, for 
achieving adequate data su:urity. Management can accredit a system to operate at a 
higher/lower level than the risk level recommended for the certification level of the system. 
If management accredits the system to operate at a higher level than is appropriate for the 
certification level, management is accepting the additional risk incurred. 
Security Requirements- Guidance for Applying the Department of Defense Trusted 
Computer System Evaluation Criteria in Specific Environments, DoD 5200.28-STD 
Application Programmer Interface (APT)- A programmer's guide which describes the 
JMCIS software libraries and how to write software modules which interface with the use 
the JMCIS software modules. 
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Approved Software - Software, while not delivered to developers by SPA WAR PD-60- as 
part of JMCIS, that has been tested and founci to be compatible with the JMCIS 
environment. (An "approved products list"- UNIX, Motif, Oracle, Sybase, WordPerfect, 
etc.) In this context, approved software implies only that is has been tested and confirmed 
to work within the JMCIS environment. It does not imply that the software has been 
approved or authorized by any government agency for any specific project. 
Audit Trail- (1) A set of records that collectively provide documentary evidence of 
processing used to aid in tracing from original transaction forward to related records and 
reports and/ or backwards from records and reports to their component source 
transactions. (2) Information collected or used to facilitate a Security Audit. 
Authentication- (1) To establish the validity of a claimed identity. (2) To provide 
protection against fraudulent transactions by establishing the validity gf message, station, 
individual, or originator. 
Category - A grouping of objects to which an non-hierarchical restrictive label is applied 
(e.g., proprietary, compartmented information). Subjects must be privileged to access a 
category. 
Certification - The technical evaluation of a system's security features, made as part of and 
in support of the approval/accreditation process, that establishes the extent to which a 
particular system's design and implementation meet a set of specified security 
requirements. 
Commercial Off-The-Shelf Software (COTS) - Software which is available commercially. 
tixamples include a particular vendor's version ofUNIX, X Windows, or Motif as well as 
standard products such as Oracle, Sybase, and Informix. 
Common Operating Environment (COE) - In the context of JMCIS, the COE is the 
collection of COTS software, core services, and APis required to build a Command 
Information System. 
Communication Channel - The physical media and devices which provide the means for 
transmitting information from one component of a network to (one or more) other 
components. 
Compartment - A designation applied to a type of sensitive information, indicating the 
special handling procedures to be used for the information and the general class of people 
who may have access to the information. It can refer to the designation of information 
belonging to one or more categories. 
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Compromise - A violation of the security system such that an unauthorized disclosure of 
sensitive information may have occurred. 
Confidentiality - The property that information is not made available or disclosed to 
unauthorized individuals, entities, or processes. 
Configuration Control - Management of changes made to a system's hardware, software, 
firmware, and documentation throughout the development and operational life of the 
system. 
Core - That minimum collection of software required for a Command Information System 
irrespective of the target mission area. This includes software comprising the runtime 
operating environment, software to receive and process military format messages, 
software to manage a track database, and software for generating tactical displays. 
Covert Channel- A communications channel that allows a process to transfer information 
in a manner that violates the system's security policy. A covert channel typically 
communicates by exploiting a mechanism not intended to be used for communication. See 
Covert storage channel and Covert timing channel. Compare Overt channel. 
Covert Storage Channel - A covert channel that involves the direct or indirect writing of a 
storage location by one process and the direct or indirect reading of the storage location 
by another process. Covert storage channels typically involve a finite resource (e.g., 
sectors on a disk) that is shared by two subjects at different security levels. 
Covert Timing Channel - A covert channel in which one process signals information to 
another by modulating its own use of system resources (e.g., CPU time) in such a way that 
this manipulation affects the real response time observed by the second process. 
Data Integrity- (1) The state that exists when computerized data is the same as that in the 
source documents and has not been exposed to accidental or malicious alteration or 
destruction. (2) The property that data has not been exposed to accidental or malicious 
alteration of destruction. 
Dedicated Security Mode - The mode of operation in which the system is specifically and 
exclusively dedicated to and controlled for the processing of one particular type or 
classification of information, either for full-time operation or for a specific period of time. 
Compare Multilevel Security Mode, System High Security Mode. 
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Discretionary Access Control (DAC)- A means of restricting access to objects based on 
the identity of subjects and/or groups to which they belong. The controls are discretionary 
in the sense that: (a) A subject with a certain access permission is capable of passing that 
permission (perhaps indirectly) on to any other subject; (b) DAC is often employed to 
enforce need-to-know; (c) Access control may be changed by an authorized individual. 
Compare to Mandatory Access Control. 
Domain - The set of objects that a subject has the ability to access. 
Dominated by (the relation)- A security level A is dominated by security level B if the 
clearance/classification in A is less than or equal to the clearance/classification in Band the 
set of access approvals (e.g., compartment designator) in A is contained in (the set 
relation) the set of access approvals in B (i.e., each access approval appearing in A also 
appears in B). Depending upon the policy enforced (e.g., non-disclosure, integrity) the 
definition of "less than or equal to" and "contained in" may vary. For example, the level of 
an object of high integrity (i.e., an object which should be modifiable by very trustworthy 
individuals) may be defined to be "less than" the level of an object oflow integrity (i.e., an 
object which is modifiable by everyone). 
Dominates (the relation) - security level B dominates security level A if A is dominated by 
B. 
Electronic Warfare Coordination Module (EWCM) - A stand ... one program originally 
intended to provided EW support. This program was canceled and its functionality was 
incorporated into NTCS-A. 
Environment - In the context of JMCIS, the environment is all software that is running 
from the time the computer is rebooted until just after an operator logs in and the system 
is ready to respond to operator queries. This includes a standard environment consisting 
of the operating system, security, installation software, windowing environment, etc. The 
environment can be broken into two classes: a runtime environment and a software 
development environment. 
Exploitable Channel - Any channel that is usable or detectable by subjects external to the 
Trusted Computing Base. 
Government Off-The-Shelf Software (GOTS) - In general usage, software·developed 
through funding by the US Government. In the context of JMCIS, the SPA WAR PD-60 
developed software provided to developers for use it. building a Command Information 
System. GOTS shoulc' not be confused with JOTS, even though they are largely the same 
software. GOTS should be thought of as a development environment for building 
applications such as JOTS. GOTS has been replaced with the JMCIS Superset. 
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Integrity - See data integrity and integrity policy. 
Integrity Policy- A security policy to prevent unauthorized uses from modifying, viz., 
writing, sensitive information. 
Joint Defense Intelligence Support Services (JDISS) - A system which combines imagery, 
communications, database, and work processing functions to provide automated 
intelligence support for deployed joint task forces. JDISS is being incorporated into 
JMCIS. 
Joint Maritime Command Information System (JMCIS) - JMCIS is both a software 
superset and the name of a system. The total collection of software provide by SPA WAR 
PD-60 for building and fielding Command Information Systems is the JMCIS Superset. 
The superset includes components from UB, OSS, NTCS-A, and other development 
efforts. JMCIS is also the name used to refer to the Command Information System fielded 
by SPAW AR PD-60 at U.S. Navy sites. 
Label - See Security Label and Sensitivity Label. 
Least Privilege - This principle requires that each subject in a system be granted the most 
restrictive set of privileges (or lowest clearance) needed for the performance of authorized 
tasks. The application of this principle limits the damage that can result from accident, 
error, or unauthorized use. 
Mandatory Access Control (A1AC)- A means of restricting access to objects based on the 
sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the 
formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity. 
Multilevel Device - A device that is used in a manner that permits it to simultaneously 
process data of two or more security levels without risk of compromise. To accomplish 
this, sensitivity labels are normally stored on the same physical medium and in the same 
form (i.e., machine-readable or human-readable) as the data being processed. 
Multilevel Secure - A class of system containing information with different sensitivities 
that simultaneously permits access by users with different security clearances and 
needs-to-know, but prevents users from obtaining access to information for which they 
lack authorization. 
Multilevel Security Mode - The mode of operation that allows two or more classification 
levels of information to be processed simultaneously within the same system when some 
users are not cleared for all levels of information present. Compare Dedicated Security 
Mode, System High Security Mode. 
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Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System (NALCO:MIS) - A 
system for performing afloat naval air station aircraft maintenance planning and 
production. NALCOMIS functionality is being incorporated in NTCSS. 
Naval Tactical Command Support System (NTCSS) - An umbrella program combining the 
functionality of SNAP, MRMS, and NALCOMIS into a common software and hardware 
baseline. NTCSS is being designed to allow feeding of information to NTCS-A. 
Navigation Sensor System Interface (NA VSS/) - A system for collecting navi 
inputs and providing them to NTCS-A. 
,.., sensor 
Navy Command and Control System -Ashore (NCCS-A) - An umbrella program managed 
by SPA WAR PD-60 for a Command and Control system for use by ashore intelligence 
centers. Built on top ofUB and sometimes referred to as OSS, NCCS-A emphasizes 
database queries, message processing for reporting ship status and movements. and 
preparation of daily briefings for senior military planners. NCCS-A is being replaced t. 
JMCIS. 
Navy Tactical Command System -Afloat (NTCS-A) - An umbrella program managed by 
SPA WAR PD-60 for a Command and Control system for use by afloat tactical 
commanders. Built on top ofUB, NTCS-A consolidates into one program several 
previously separate systems for track management (JOTS), database (NIPS), status board 
displays (TIMS), imagery (NIEWS), and assorted TDAs. NTCS-A is being replaced by 
JMCIS. 
Navy WWMCCS Software Standmdization (NWSS) - An upgrade ofWWMCCS designed 
to provide Navy status of forces data. NWSS functionality has been incorporated into 
oss. 
Network Architecture - The set of layers and protocols (including formats and standards 
that different hardware/software must comply with to achieve stated objectives) which 
define a Network. 
Network Component - A network subsystem which is evaluatable for compliance with the 
trusted network interpretations, relative to that policy induced on the component by the 
overall network policy. 
Network Connection - A network connection is any logical or physical path from one host 
to another that makes possible the transmission of information from one host to the other. 
An example is a TCP connection. But also, when a host transmits an IP datagram 
employing only the services of its "connectionless" Internet Protocol interpreter, there is 
considered to be a connection between the source and the destination hosts for this 
transaction. 
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Network Reference Monitor - An access control concept that refers to an abstract machine 
that mediates all access to objects within the network by subjects with the network. 
Network Security - The protection of networks and their services from unauthorized 
modification, destruction, or disclosure. Providing an assurance that the network 
performs its critical functions correctly and there are no harmful side-effects. Includes 
providing for information accuracy. 
NTCS-A Integrated Tactical Environment Subsystem (NITES)- A subsystem of 
NTCS-A, built on top ofUB, that combines oceanographic, weather, and environmental 
data. 
NTCS-A Intelligence Processing System (NIPS) - The component ofNTCS-A which 
manages database queries and certain message handling tasks. NIPS .is similar in some 
respects to functionality contained in OSS, but uses the Sybase COTS package for 
database management. 
Object - A passive entity that contains or receives information. Access to an object 
potentially implies access to the information it contains. Examples of objects are: records, 
blocks, pages, segments, files, directories, directory trees, and programs, as well as bits, 
bytes, words, fields, processors, video displays, keyboards, clocks, printers, etc. 
Operations Support System (OSS) - A system built on top ofUB that was specifically 
designed for use in ashore Navy intelligence centers. OSS emphasizes database queries 
and message processing for obtaining status of ships. OSS is sometimes incorrectly used 
synonymously with DSS (a software component ofOSS) and is sometimes correctly 
referred to as NCCS-A (Navy Command and Control System- Ashore). OSS uses the 
Oracle database product. 
Overt Channel - An overt channel is a path within a network which is designed for the 
authorized transfer of data. 
Penetration - The successful violation of a protected system. 
Read - A fundamental operation that results only in the flow of information from an object 
to a subject. 
Reference Monitor Concept - An access control concept that refers to an abstract machine 
that mediates all accesses to objects by subjects. 
Reliability - The extent to which a system can be expected to perform its intended 
function with required precision. 
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Runtime Environment - The portion of the software environment that is required to 
properly execute JMCIS applications. 
Secrecy Policy - A security policy to prevent unauthorized users from reading sensitive 
information. 
Security Architecture - The subset of computer architecture dealing with the security of 
the computer or network system. 
Security-Compliant Channel- A channel is Security-Compliant if the enforcement of the 
network policy depends only upon characteristics of the channel either (1) included in the 
evaluation, or (2) assumed as a installation constraint and clearly documented in the 
Trusted Facility Manual. 
Security Kernel - The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a Trusted Computing 
Base (or Network Trusted Computing Base partition) that implement the reference 
monitor concept. It must mediate all accesses, be protected from modification, and be 
verifiable as correct. 
Security Level - The combination of hierarchical classification and a set of non-hierarchical 
categories that represents the sensitivity of information. 
Security Policy- The set of laws, rules, and practices that regulate how an organization 
manages, protects, and distributes sensitive information. 
Segment- A collection of one or more CSCis (Computer Software Configuration Items) 
most conveniently manage as a unit. Segments are generally defined to keep related 
CSCis together (VB core, DSS Tables, NSOF, Strikeplot, etc.) so that functionality may 
be easily included or excluded in a JMCIS variant. 
Sensitivity Label - A piece of information that represents the security level of an object 
and that describes the sensitivity (e.g., classification) of the data in the object. Sensitivity 
labels are used by the NTCB as the basis for mandatory access control decisions. 
Shipboard Non-tactical ADP Program (SNAP) - A system for performing afloat 
inventory and financial management. SNAP functionality is being incorporated into 
NTCSS. 
Storage Object - An object that supports both read and write accesses. 
Subject- An active entity, generally in the form of a person, process, or device that causes 
information to flow among objects or changes the system state. Technically, a 
process/domain pair. 
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System High - The highest security level supported by a system at a particular time or in a 
particular environment. 
System High Security Mode - The mode of operation in which system hardware and 
software is only trusted to provide discretionary protection between users. In this mode, 
the entire system, to include all components electrically and/or stored. All system users in 
this environment must possess clearances and authorization for all information contained 
in the system. All system output must be clearly marked with the highest classification and 
all system caveats until the information has been reviewed manually by an authorized 
individual to ensure appropriate classifications and that caveats have been affixed. 
System Low - The lowest security level supported by a system at a particular time or in a 
particular environment. 
Tactical Decision Aids (FDAs)- A software module which serves as a support function 
to the basic Command Information System. JMCIS provides several TDAs which include 
satellite vulnerability calculations, radio wave propagation, closet point of approach 
calculations, and water space management. 
Tactical Information Management System (IIMS) - A system designed for use on afloat 
platforms to provide status information to tactical commanders. The status information is 
frequently presented as a result of a database query or in the form of dynamically updated 
status information displays (called ASTABS- Automatic Status Boards). TIMS connects 
to the NTCS-A LAN through a network of Personal Computers to a centralized T AC-3 
server. 
Tactical Support Center (ISC)- A Command Information System, currently built on top 
ofUB and OSS, for supporting Anti-Submarine Warfare commanders. 
Trap-door - A hidden software or hardware mechanism that permits system protection 
mechanisms to be circumvented. It is activated in some non-apparent manner (e.g., 
special"random" key sequence at a terminal). 
Trojan horse - A computer program with an apparently or actually useful function that 
contains additional (hidden) functions that surreptitiously exploit the legitimate 
authorizations of the invoking process to the detriment of security. For example, making 
a "blind copy" of a sensitive files for the creator of the Trojan Horse. 
Trusted Channel- A mechanism by which two NTCB partitions can communicate 
directly. This mechanism can be activated by either of the NTCB partitions, cannot be 
imitated by untrusted software, and maintains the integrity of information that is sent over 
it. A trusted channel may be needed for the correct operation of other security 
mechanisms. 
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Trusted Computer System - A system that employs sufficient hardware and software 
integrity measures to allow its use for processing simultaneously a range of sensitive or 
classified information. 
Trusted Computing Base (TCB) - The totality of protection mecha...-,isms within a 
computer system -- including hardware, firmware, and software-- the combination of 
which is responsible for enforcing a security policy. It creates a basic protection 
environment and provides additional user services required for a tmsted computer system. 
The ability of a trusted computing base to correctly enforce a security policy depends 
solely on the mechanisms within the TCB and on the correct input by system 
administrative personnel of parameters (e.g., a user's clearance) related to the security 
policy. 
Trusted Path - A mechanism by which a person at a terminal can communicate directly 
with the Trusted Computing Base. This mechanism can only be activated by the person 
on the Trusted Computing Base and cannot be imitated by untrusted software. 
Trusted Subject- A subject that is part of the TCB. It has the ability to violate the 
security policy, but is trusted not to actually do so. For example in the BeU-LaPaduUa 
model a trusted subject is not constrained by the *-property and thus has the ability to 
write sensitive information into an object whose level is not dominated by the (maximum) 
level of the subject, but it is trusted to only write information into objects with a label 
appropriate for the actual level of the information. 
Unified Build (UB) - An environment, a set of development tools, documentation, and 
modules for building a Command Information System. Strictly speaking, UB is not a 
deliverable system to an end user, but is delivered to developers only for use in building an 
end system. UB grew out of a consolidation of Navy Afloat and Ashore requirements and 
is often used synonymously with GOTS and JOTS, and is sometime incorrectly referred to 
as JMCIS or an end user system. 
User - Any person who interacts directly with a network system. This includes both those 
persons who are authorized to interact with the system and those people who interact 
without authorization (e.g., active or passive wiretappers). Note that "user" does not 
include "operators." "system programmers," "technical control officer," "system security 
officers," and other system support personnel. They are distinct from users and are 
subject to the Trusted Facility Manual and the System Architecture requirements. Such 
individuals may change the system parameters of the network system, for example by 
defining membership of a group. These individuals may also have the separate role of 
users. 
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Variant- A JMCIS software configuration loaded on a single CPU in the system. The 
concept is that while JMCIS as a whole represents a "superset," a variant is that subset 
installed l ~ a single CPU for a specific mission area such as mission planning, battlegroup 
database management, or anti-drug support. 
Virus- Malicious software, a form of Trojan horse, which reproduces itself in other 
executable code. 
Write - A fundamental operation that results only in the flow of information from a subject 
to an object. 
Write Access- Permission to write an object. 
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